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IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................472
In recent years, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the
pharmaceutical industry have become easy targets for society’s growing
distrust of the federal government’s ability to protect its citizens from serious
health risks.1 Whether because of reports of the FDA’s repeated failures to
identify serious adverse effects associated with prescription medications or
because of stories of pharmaceutical manufacturers withholding safety data
and falsifying trial results to gain marketing approval, the public’s confidence
in the industry and its regulators has dissipated.2 Perhaps the public is correct.
The majority of Americans believe that an FDA approval equates to “the
Good Housekeeping seal of approval.”3 In reality, however, at the time of
approval and introduction into the open market, prescription medications carry
significant, unknown health risks.4 When these adverse effects are ultimately
discovered, the results can be catastrophic.5 For example, in 2007, eight years
after receiving marketing approval from the FDA, the diabetes drug Avandia
was found to increase the risk of heart attacks in patients taking the
medication.6 In 2006, thirteen years after FDA approval, the medication
Trasylol—used to reduce bleeding during surgery—was found to increase the
risks of kidney failure, heart attack, and stroke.7 In 2004 and 2005, four and
five years after their initial approvals, respectively, Cox-2 inhibitors8 Bextra
and Vioxx were withdrawn from the market after it was discovered that they

1. See Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 431 (2010) (citing a
drop in the public’s confidence in the FDA).
2. See, e.g., id. at 428–31; Jeanne Lenzer, Scandals Have Eroded US Public’s Confidence
in Drug Industry, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 247, 247 (2004).
3. Risk and Responsibility: The Roles of FDA and Pharmaceutical Companies in Ensuring
the Safety of Approved Drugs, Like Vioxx: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th
Cong. 2 (2005) [hereinafter Risk and Responsibility Hearing] (statement of Rep. Tom Davis,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform). But see Evans, supra note 1, at 428 (arguing that many
people overestimate the risk-benefit data available when a drug is approved by the FDA).
4. See infra notes 6–10 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases in which
drugs with unknown side effects were approved).
5. See Evans, supra note 1, at 429–30 (explaining the negative consequences for patients
taking drugs with unknown harmful effects).
6. Steven E. Nissen & Kathy Wolski, Effect of Rosiglitazone on the Risk of Myocardial
Infarction and Death from Cardiovascular Causes, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2457, 2458, 2467
(2007).
7. Dennis T. Mangano et al., The Risk Associated with Aprotinin in Cardiac Surgery, 354
NEW ENG. J. MED. 353, 361 (2006); Kris Hundley, Researcher Beat Pfizer, Then Lost to It, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 26, 2009, at 1A.
8. Cox-2 inhibitors are a type of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID). See, e.g.,
David J. Graham, Cox-2 Inhibitors, Other NSAIDs, and Cardiovascular Risk: The Seduction of
Common Sense, 296 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1653, 1653 (2006).
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increased the risks of heart attack and stroke.9 In total, millions of patients
were potentially exposed to risks that they might otherwise have avoided if the
serious side effects were discovered earlier.10
Unfortunately, these examples cannot be dismissed as isolated incidents.11
Postmarketing discovery of adverse effects is common12 and continues today.13
Moreover, the significance of these later-discovered side effects might be
marginalized were it not for the enormity of the patient population impacted.14
In some cases, a single drug will have been prescribed to millions of patients
for years before a serious, previously unknown adverse effect is discovered.15
If one was able to pinpoint the cause of the FDA’s inability to detect these
health risks before approval, the problem of postmarketing discovery of
adverse effects might be eliminated altogether.16 Instead, to borrow from the
medical lexicon, a constellation of factors ultimately contributes to the present
reality that as many as half of all approved drugs have an unknown side effect
when released.17
Critics have accused the FDA of an inability—be it through underfunding,18
understaffing,19 general incompetence,20 or collusion with manufacturers21—to
9. Cox-2 Selective (Includes Bextra, Celebrex, and Vioxx) and Non-Selective
Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders
/ucm103420.htm (last updated Nov. 27, 2012).
10. At the very least, the public should be made aware of the risks. See, e.g., Steve
Sternberg, Diabetes Drug Called Heart Death Risk, USA TODAY, May 22, 2007, at 1A
(suggesting how the FDA and pharmaceutical companies failed to inform the public that a
blockbuster drug increased the risk of heart disease by thirty percent); see also Evans, supra note
1, at 427 (noting that Americans spend $230 billion on prescription drugs annually).
11. See infra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, In the Money, and in Court: Drug Industry Braces for New
Suits over Even More of Its Products, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2006, at C1 (noting that, in the wake
of the Vioxx litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys in products liability suits claimed that pharmaceutical
companies marketed their drugs while hiding early indications of side effects).
13. See, e.g., Duff Wilson, F.D.A. Puts New Limits on Cholesterol Drug, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 2011, at B2 (noting that new safety restrictions were placed on cholesterol-lowering
medications more than ten years after receiving marketing approval from the FDA).
14. See, e.g., The Adequacy of FDA to Assure the Safety of the Nation’s Drug Supply:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy
& Commerce, 110th Cong. 59 (2007) [hereinafter Adequacy of FDA Hearings] (testimony of
David J. Graham, Associate Director, Science and Medicine, FDA Office of Surveillance and
Epidemiology) (asserting that Vioxx caused up to 140,000 heart attacks in Americans, of which
60,000 resulted in death).
15. See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 12, at C1 (citing examples of drugs with unknown side
effects being prescribed to a large pool of users).
16. See Evans, supra note 1, at 425–27.
17. Id. at 430 (quoting BENGT D. FURBERG & CURT D. FURBERG, EVALUATING CLINICAL
RESEARCH 8 (2d ed. 2007)).
18. See, e.g., Risk and Responsibility Hearing, supra note 3, at 43 (statement of Rep. Henry
A. Waxman, Member, H. Comm. on Government Reform) (highlighting the FDA’s
acknowledgment that it lacks sufficient resources to inspect prescription drug promotional
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require sufficient pre-approval clinical testing of medications to monitor
sufficiently manufacturers’ compliance with those tests or to monitor
adequately the safety of approved medications once on the open market.22
Given the FDA’s conflicting mandate: “[to get] new[,] safe[,] and effective
drugs to market quickly and efficiently,” the drug approval process vis-à-vis
safety assessment lends itself to second-guessing.23 In light of the failures of
adverse event detection, this mandate could suggest that the FDA has made a
conscious decision to emphasize expediency at the expense of safety.24 Like
materials for information on accuracy, safety, and efficacy); 153 CONG. REC. 25,038 (2007)
(statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (noting that the 2006 revenues for a single prescription drug
were more than two hundred times the entire FDA budget dedicated to postmarketing surveillance
for the same time period).
19. Should FDA Drug and Medical Device Regulation Bar State Liability Claims?: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 7 (2008) (statement of Rep.
Tom Davis, Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform); see also Tom Costello, 100
Days Later, Nation Waits for FDA Overhaul, NBCNEWS.COM (April 26, 2009, 12:33:50 AM),
www.nbcnews.com/id/30388073/#.UTpDZfJBA78 (suggesting that the FDA can only inspect one
percent of imported foods because of a lack of personnel).
20. Adequacy of FDA Hearings, supra note 14, at 60 (testimony of David J. Graham,
Associate Director, Science and Medicine, FDA Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology)
(claiming that the FDA’s failure to protect the public health was rooted in its institutional
decision-making process).
21. Id. (arguing that the FDA improperly regards the pharmaceutical industry as a client).
22. Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the
Regulation of Medical Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 932 (“FDA epitomizes ‘the hollow
government syndrome—an agency with expanded responsibilities, stagnant resources, and the
consequent inability to implement or enforce its statutory mandates.’” (quoting Peter Barton Hutt,
The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008))).
23. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT (PDUFA) IV: DRUG
SAFETY FIVE-YEAR PLAN 2008-2012, at 2 (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/downlo
ads/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/UCM119244.pdf; see also Catherine T.
Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role
of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS, 587, 596–97 (2005) (finding the FDA’s
promotion of innovation, which lends itself to early drug release, counterintuitive to its mission of
protecting consumers’ safety).
24. As further proof of the FDA’s commitment to expediency, Congress enacted the Food
and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) in 1997, which codified the FDA’s
longstanding practice of fast-tracking approval of a drug that has the potential to address unmet
needs for a serious or life-threatening condition. Food and Drug Administration Modernization
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 112, 111 Stat. 2996, 2309–10 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 356
(2006)); see also Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration’s Use of Postmarketing
(Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 330 & n.360
(2006) (citing S. REP. NO. 105-43, at 43 (1997)). By definition, drugs approved on a fast-track
basis have been proven neither safe nor effective, but rather are approved based on a “predict[ed]
clinical benefit.” 21 U.S.C. § 356(b)(1); see also id. § 356(b)(2) (authorizing the FDA to
condition approval on postmarketing studies that confirm a clinical benefit); id.
§ 356(b)(3)(B)–(C) (authorizing the FDA to withdraw approval if postmarketing data shows no
clinical benefit or finds the product unsafe or ineffective).
Those who would take issue with the expedited approval process must also note that the
fast-track approval guidelines themselves were the direct result of criticism of Congress’s
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their counterpart in the drug approval process, manufacturers have done little
to engender support from the public, routinely withholding safety data from the
FDA.25
In the case of Avandia, both the FDA and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), the
drug’s manufacturer, overlooked clinical trial data that supported a link
between the medication and heart attacks, leaving a third party to discover the
risk when it analyzed the publicly available data.26 Evidence further suggested
that GSK conducted an earlier safety study that identified the cardiac risks at
issue, but suppressed the data and did not submit it to the FDA.27 Similarly,
Bayer, Trasylol’s manufacturer, was found to have withheld information from
the FDA study that suggested a link between its medication and the increased
risks of heart attack and stroke.28 Likewise, in the case of Cox-2 inhibitors, not
only have critics suggested data withholding by the manufacturers,29 but they
have further alleged that the FDA was complicit in the data suppression,
asserting that it was aware of the data’s absence yet did nothing to expose
publicly the drug’s risks.30
The purpose of this Article is not to disparage the FDA or the
pharmaceutical industry. Rhetoric and animus do not improve public health

mid-twentieth century strengthening of FDA regulations to require “proof of safety and efficacy
for all new drugs,” which critics viewed as preventing patients suffering from life-threatening
illnesses from timely receiving treatment. See, e.g., Parasidis, supra note 22, at 942–44;
Steenburg, supra note 24, at 319 (“In the case of HIV and cancer treatments that conceivably
could extend the lives of patients without any other options, withholding approval potentially
consigned patients to a premature grave. The corresponding risk of subjecting patients to the side
effects of drugs that failed to live up to their original billing struck many people—particularly
patients themselves—as comparatively trivial.”).
25. See Gardiner Harris, Drug Maker Hid Test Data, Files Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
2010, at A1.
26. Id. (“The heart risks from Avandia first became public in May 2007, with a study from a
cardiologist at the Cleveland Clinic who used data the company was forced by a lawsuit to post
on its own Web site.”).
27. Id.
28. Building a 21st Century FDA: Proposals to Improve Drug Safety and Innovation:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 41 (2006)
(statement of Jim Guest, President and Chief Executive Officer, Consumers Union) (noting that
Trasylol’s manufacturer, Bayer, withheld from the FDA news of a study that showed an increased
risk of “death, serious kidney damage, congestive heart failure and stroke”).
29. Paid to Prescribe? Exploring the Relationship Between Doctors and the Drug Industry:
S. Hearing Before the Special Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 50 (2007) [hereinafter Paid to
Prescribe Hearing] (testimony of Peter Lurie, Deputy Director, Public Citizen’s Health Research
Group, Washington, D.C.) (noting Pfizer’s publication of incomplete trial data on its drug,
Celebrex, because Pfizer knew the full data set was not persuasive in demonstrating the drug’s
benefit).
30. Id.; see also Adequacy of FDA Hearings, supra note 14, at 75–76 (testimony of David J.
Graham, Associate Director, Science and Medicine, FDA Office of Surveillance and
Epidemiology) (discussing data suppression).
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any more than they serve as a detterent to those who would undermine it.31
Rather, to better serve the public welfare as it relates to
FDA-approved medications, focus must be on rapid identification of all serious
health risks associated with marketed pharmaceuticals, thereby reducing
unexpected injuries and compensating those injured by the formerly unknown
risks.32 To this end, Congress and the FDA took a significant step forward in
achieving rapid detection of unknown, serious health risks in marketed
medications in 2007.33 The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act
of 2007 (FDAAA)34 marked a change in the agency’s supervision of
pharmaceutical manufacturers and, particularly, its regulation and enforcement
of postmarketing surveillance of FDA-approved medications.35
Before 2007, the FDA was limited in its ability to monitor a medication’s
safety after granting marketing approval.36 Although the FDA served as a
repository for postmarketing adverse-event data reported by manufacturers,
physicians, and patients through its Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS)
database,37 before 2007 the FDA did not routinely monitor the database for
evidence of a drug’s previously unknown side effects.38 Further, the AERS
database was limited in its information pool.39 To make matters worse, when a
possible unlabeled side effect was identified, the FDA lacked authority to
require the manufacturer to conduct postmarketing trials to determine

31. Cf. Robert H. Eckel & Ronald M. Krauss, American Heart Association Call to Action:
Obesity as a Major Risk Factor for Coronary Heart Disease, 97 CIRCULATION 2099, 2099–100
(1998) (urging action on the part of healthcare providers, legislators, insurers, and the public so
that effective treatments could be formed).
32. Robert G. Hauser, Here We Go Again—Another Failure of Postmarketing Device
Surveillance, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 873, 874 (2012).
33. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat.
823 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
34. Id.
35. See id. § 905, 121 Stat. at 944–45.
36. In actuality, postmarketing surveillance was entrusted almost exclusively to the
manufacturers. See, e.g., Laura B. Faden & Christopher-Paul Milne, Pharmacovigilance
Activities in the United States, European Union and Japan: Harmonic Convergence or
Convergent Evolution?, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 683, 686 (2008) (stating that, under previous law,
the industry was responsible for any surveillance activities).
37. See, e.g., Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS) (Formerly AERS), U.S. FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2012) [hereinafter FDA
Adverse Event Reporting System] (providing frequently asked questions on FAERS).
38. See, e.g., Struve, supra note 23, at 601 (citing a 2002 internal FDA survey, which found
that respondents were not confident in the monitoring process once drugs were approved and that
the FDA was incapable of monitoring or acting on gathered information).
39. See discussion infra Part I.A. Specifically, the database was not linked to other patient
information sources (such as Medicare and insurance company databases) across which searches
could identify entire patient populations that were prescribed a suspected drug. See, e.g., 153
CONG. REC. 25,163 (2007) (statement of Sen. Judd Gregg).
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causation.40 The FDA also lacked the ability to require the manufacturer to
change the drug’s label to warn consumers of newly discovered risks.41
Through passage of the FDAAA, Congress required the FDA to “conduct
regular, bi-weekly screening[s] of the [AERS] database, and post quarterly
reports on the AERS website of any new safety information or potential signal
of serious risk identified within the last quarter.”42 Congress ordered the FDA
to develop and implement a single, comprehensive data network of patient
healthcare information, including all serious adverse drug experiences,43 which
would become known as the Sentinel System and would contain at least 100
million patients’ data by July 1, 2012.44 Congress authorized the FDA to
require that manufacturers conduct postmarketing clinical trials when a
previously unknown safety risk is identified and to make the suspect drug’s
continued marketing contingent upon completion of the required analysis.45
Further, Congress empowered the FDA to require drug manufacturers to
change their labels.46
Despite the number and significance of the changes to the FDA’s regulatory
authority, the FDAAA forsakes or, at best, ignores those patients first exposed
to FDA-approved medications—patients whose reactions to the medications
make the FDAAA’s amplified postmarketing surveillance system relevant and
effective.47 Even with the FDAAA’s increased focus on postmarketing
surveillance, the FDA will not be able to eliminate unknown adverse effects
before a percentage of patients has experienced the side effects after the drug
has been approved for marketing.48 In fact, the Sentinel System is specifically
designed to discover previously unknown adverse events postmarketing.49

40. See 153 CONG. REC. 25,162–63 (statement of Sen. Michael Enzi).
41. See id. at 25,163–64 (statement of Sen. Judd Gregg) (finding that the FDA now has
express authority to accomplish this).
42. Faden & Milne, supra note 36, at 686; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(5)(A) (Supp. IV
2011).
43. A “serious adverse drug experience” is defined as any adverse event associated with a
drug that results in death, immediate risk of death, hospitalization, incapacity, birth defect, etc.
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(1), (4) (Supp. IV 2011).
44. Id. § 355(k)(3); see also Parasidis, supra note 22, at 951–52 (describing the FDAAA’s
requirement to track postmarket safety concerns). In response, the Sentinel Initiative was created,
which “aims to create a nationwide electronic reporting system for monitoring medical product
safety.” Id.
45. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o) (Supp. IV 2011).
46. Id. § 355(o)(4)(E).
47. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. 25,162–63 (2007) (statement of Sen. Michael Enzi) (giving
several examples of how the bill expands the FDA’s ability to handle safety problems occurring
post-approval, including requiring label changes).
48. Hauser, supra note 32, at 874 (describing the current surveillance system as “passive”).
49. See id. (characterizing the Sentinel Initiative as “active,” and detailing the real-time
network’s intent to identify safety concerns in a timely manner).
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Discovery of these effects will always lag behind the injuries that make their
detection possible.50 Thus, a drug’s first subscribers unwittingly serve as
participants in the drug’s extended “clinical trial,” but without the disclosures
and protections normally afforded to such participants.51 When new side
effects are identified postmarketing, these first subscribers are left without
recourse for their injuries.52
Rather than relying on the lengthy and fickle litigation process for
compensation or further burdening an insurance network at its breaking point,
an alternative compensation scheme must be implemented to compensate for
injuries caused by a drug’s unknown side effects.53 Accordingly, this Article
proposes the creation of an FDA-administered fund from which injury claims
attributable to unlabeled adverse effects of FDA-medications would be paid.
Not unlike state and federal workers’ compensation plans, the fund would
insure people who suffer injury from an unlabeled side effect after taking an
FDA-approved medication.54 This compensation system would be funded
entirely by pharmaceutical manufacturers, with contribution to the fund a
prerequisite of drug approval.55
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I of this Article details the FDA’s
postmarketing surveillance authority pre-FDAAA and the significant changes
that the Act and its incorporated Sentinel System provided to the FDA’s ability
to monitor medications on the open market. Part II explains why the legal
system fails to sufficiently compensate those injured by prescription
medications, regardless of the manufacturer’s level of fault. Part II further
explores the stress placed on public and private insurance plans to budget for
and compensate parties following injuries from unknown risks. Part III
proposes the adoption of a no-fault compensation system that would replace
50. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(c).
51. See infra Part I.C.
52. See infra Part II (finding that neither tort nor insurance claims sufficiently protect first
subscribers to newly approved medications).
53. This Article proposes that the alternative compensation scheme articulated herein should
apply only to those expenses incurred by consumers in the open market following injury from an
unlabeled adverse event occurring in the postmarketing period. When known side effects of a
marketed drug are disclosed in a product’s labeling, a physician can make an informed decision
as to whether or not to prescribe the drug to a patient and warn the patient about the possible side
effects; insurers can plan for labeled risks and fund accordingly. See, e.g., Parasidis, supra note
22, at 932 (“If marketed products contain unreliable risk-benefit disclosures, providers are unable
to evaluate treatment options accurately and the ability of patients to provide informed consent is
compromised.”). Conversely, clinical trial participants knowingly consent to experimental
treatment on the understanding that their participation will help discover unknown health risks,
which the FDA will use to warn physicians and patients following marketing approval. This
Article addresses those patients who bridge the gap between these two groups—that is, those who
do not consent to experimental therapy but are also without complete knowledge of all potential
risks associated with a drug at the time of prescription.
54. See infra Part III.A.
55. See infra Part III.B.2.
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litigation and insurance as the primary source of recompense for unlabeled
drug-related injury and addresses several key considerations in implementing
such a plan.
I. IDENTIFYING UNKNOWN ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS IN THE
POSTMARKETING PERIOD
“Despite [the FDA’s] vigilant premarket review, . . . all possible side effects
of a drug can’t be anticipated based on preapproval studies involving only
several hundred to several thousand patients . . . .”56 Stated more bluntly,
virtually every drug approved by the FDA for marketing in the United States
contains undiscovered health risks that will only become known after the drug
is exposed to a larger patient population.57 For this reason, “[a] vital part of
[the FDA’s] mission is to monitor the safety and effectiveness of drugs that are
currently available to the American people.”58 Until 2007, however, the
FDA’s ability to conduct postmarketing surveillance was hampered by a lack
of complete access to healthcare data.59 Contrary to its common meaning, the
FDA’s postmarketing surveillance was reactionary and dependent upon others
to notify it of potential adverse health effects.60 As a result, although the FDA
could monitor the safety of approved drugs retroactively, it could not protect
initial consumers of newly approved medications by detecting latent risks; it
could only notify the public of newly discovered risks after unknown side
effects were reported.61
56. Postmarketing Surveillance Programs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/ucm090385.
htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2009); see also Evans, supra note 1, at 456 (discussing the delicate
ethical balance between the necessity of testing drugs before approval and the need to quickly
introduce new drugs to the market).
57. Struve, supra note 23, at 598–99 (stating that premarket studies are not foolproof and
inevitably miss a side effect or complication).
58. Surveillance: Post Drug-Approval Activities, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/default.htm
(last updated Nov. 10, 2010).
59. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE SENTINEL INITIATIVE: ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC
HEALTHCARE DATA FOR MORE THAN 25 MILLION LIVES 1–2, 4 (2010) [hereinafter SENTINEL
2010 REPORT], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative
/UCM233360.pdf.
60. “Surveillance” is defined as to “watch” or to “guard” against. OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 309 (2d ed. 1989). Before 2007, the FDA’s postmarketing surveillance system was
a wholly passive one. See SENTINEL 2010 REPORT, supra note 59, at 1–2, 4 (describing
adverse-event surveillance systems as passive because, for the FDA to be aware of a drug’s
adverse effects, it relies on and require recognition and reports of safety concerns); see also, e.g.,
Anna B. Laakmann, Collapsing the Distinction Between Experimentation and Treatment in the
Regulation of New Drugs, 62 ALA. L. REV. 305, 337 (2011) (arguing that the FDA’s surveillance
program is reactive and lacks the FDA’s “systematic rigor” characteristic of its approval process);
Parasidis, supra note 22, at 950 (stating that the FDA has consistently relied on passive
surveillance methods).
61. Parasidis, supra note 22, at 948 (outlining the enactment of the FDAAA).
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A. The FDA’s Pharmacovigilance Program Before 2007
Until 2007, the FDA’s postmarketing surveillance of approved drugs
consisted almost exclusively of its Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS).62
The AERS database comprises information received both from manufacturers,
who must report to the FDA, and from healthcare professionals, consumers,
and patients that report information voluntarily.63 Federal regulations require
pharmaceutical manufacturers to report to the FDA all adverse experiences
“associated with the use of a drug in humans.”64 Specifically, a manufacturer’s
postmarketing surveillance obligations include, but are not limited to:
 Prompt review of “all adverse drug experience information
obtained or otherwise received by the [manufacturer] from
any source . . . .”65
 Development of “written procedures for the surveillance,
receipt, evaluation, and reporting of postmarketing adverse
drug experiences to [the] FDA.”66
62. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA): Adding Resources and Improving
Performance in FDA Review of New Drug Applications, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm119253.htm
(last updated May 3, 2010) [hereinafter PDUFA White Paper] (stating that the AERS database
provided the FDA with most of its postmarketing safety data before the FDAAA was passed); see
also Parasidis, supra note 22, at 950 (characterizing the AERS database as the FDA’s “primary
source” for postmarketing safety data).
63. FDA Adverse Event Reporting System, supra note 37; see also Laakmann, supra note
60, at 337 (“FDA postmarketing monitoring involves a system of mandatory reporting of adverse
drug reactions (ADRs) by manufacturers and voluntary ADR reporting by health professionals
and patients.”). However, no affirmative duty to search for adverse events exists. Parasidis,
supra note 22, at 950; see also Laakmann, supra note 60, at 337 (stating that firms must only
disclose those adverse effects reported by physicians and consumers). Consequently, some
commentators criticize the FDA’s postmarketing surveillance program as encouraging drug
manufacturers to sit on their hands rather than actively pursue safety information on their
products. See, e.g., Struve, supra note 23, at 602 (declaring that drug manufacturers are
disincentivized from identifying adverse drug effects because disclosing such information may
harm the business).
64. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a), (c) (2012). Federal regulations require that manufacturers submit
all adverse event reports to the FDA on Form FDA 3500A or a comparable form or electronic
format. Id. § 314.80(f). This form requires manufacturers to report: (1) patient identifying
information, including age, sex, and weight at the time of the event; (2) the adverse event
experienced and subsequent outcome (e.g., death); (3) the date of the event; (4) a description of
the event; (5) relevant patient laboratory data; (6) other relevant patient medical history; (7) the
suspect drug, including dose, frequency of use, administration method, therapy dates, and
reason(s) for use; and (8) whether the event ceased after discontinuation of the drug and/or
reappeared after reintroduction of the drug. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FORM FDA 3500A,
at 1, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/MedWatch/HowToReport/DownloadForms/ucm
082728.pdf [hereinafter FORM FDA 3500A]. Although adverse event reports submitted
voluntarily are not governed by similar federal regulation, the FDA established the MedWatch
program in 1993 that allows physicians to submit adverse drug events electronically. Laakmann,
supra note 60, at 337.
65. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b).
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Disclosure of “each adverse drug experience that is both
serious and unexpected” no later than fifteen days after
receipt of the information.67
 Disclosure of all other adverse drug experiences (i.e., either
not serious, or expected, or both) “at quarterly intervals, for
[three] years from the date of approval of the application,
and then at annual intervals.”68
Although seemingly comprehensive in the data captured, solely relying on
AERS as a postmarketing risk-detection tool proves the inability to detect
unknown health risks, undermining the AERS database’s effectiveness.69
Postmarketing surveillance exists to ensure that accurate and comprehensive
warnings regarding a product’s safety are disseminated upon the detection of a
health risk.70 As required by federal regulation, a drug’s label must be updated
to disclose clinically significant adverse reactions and other potential safety
hazards when a causal connection has been established with the drug, though
such causation does not have to be definitive.71 Problematically, however,
adverse event reports by themselves cannot be used to establish a causal link
between the medication and injury.72
Before 2007, the FDA’s pharmacovigilance program “principally involve[d]
the identification and evaluation of safety signals,” which are defined as “an
excess of adverse events compared to what would be expected to be associated
with a product’s use.”73 A signal’s identification is derived from analysis of
66. Id.
67. Id. § 314.80(c)(1)(i). The regulations define “serious adverse drug experience” as one
that results in death, life-threatening injury, inpatient hospitalization, disability, or birth defect.
Id. § 314.80(a). An “unexpected” experience is one not already listed in the labeling for the
medication. Id.
68. Id. § 314.80(b)–(c).
69. See, e.g., Laakmann, supra note 60, at 338–39; Parasidis, supra note 22, at 951
(criticizing the FDA’s current postmarketing framework); Struve, supra note 23, at 603–05.
70. See Postmarketing Surveillance Programs, supra note 56.
71. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2012). Some scholars suggest a “causal
association” may be based on temporality between exposure to the drug and observed adverse
effect, dose-response relationship, biological plausibility, and replication of the finding. Saad
A.W. Shakir & Deborah Layton, Causal Association in Pharmacovigilance and
Pharmacoepidemiology: Thoughts on the Application of the Austin Bradford-Hill Criteria, 25
DRUG SAFETY 467, 469–70 (2002).
72. FDA Adverse Event Reporting System, supra note 37 (describing the FAERS’s
shortcomings and reasons why it cannot be used in calculating the incidence of an adverse
medical error in the U.S. population); see also Struve, supra note 23, at 604 (arguing that a
substantial number of adverse event reports received may not involve a causal link between the
drug and the injury). These flaws are significant because, without proof of a causal relationship, a
manufacturer is not required to warn of a health risk identified postmarketing. 21 C.F.R.
§ 201.57(c)(6)(i).
73. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE
PRACTICES AND PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGIC ASSESSMENT 4 (2005) [hereinafter GOOD
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adverse events (or “case reports”) submitted to the FDA by pharmaceutical
manufacturers, healthcare professionals, or consumers and is stored in the
FDA’s AERS database.74 Yet, as previously mentioned, federal regulations
only mandate that manufacturers75 report adverse events,76 whereas healthcare
providers and patients only report these events voluntarily.77 Moreover, there
is no control over duplication in AERS reporting.78 As a result—and as the
FDA readily admits—case reports are both under- and over-reported.79
Because the total number of adverse events is unknown and the total number of
prescriptions can only be estimated,80 a true incidence rate cannot be
determined.81
PHARMACOVIGILANCE
PRACTICES],
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads
/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126834.pdf. The FDA defines pharmacovigilance “to
mean all scientific and data gathering activities relating to the detection, assessment, and
understanding of adverse events.” Id.
74. See FDA Adverse Event Reporting System, supra note 37.
75. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(1)(iii) (2012) (mandating that the section applies to those in the
chain of supply, such as packers and distributors).
76. Id. § 314.80(c); see also FDA Adverse Event Reporting System, supra note 37
(“Reporting of adverse events from the point of care is voluntary in the United States.”).
77. FDA Adverse Event Reporting System, supra note 37. Because adverse event data
reported from the point of care is voluntary, the data submitted to the FDA is woefully
inadequate. See, e.g., Laakmann, supra note 60, at 338 (noting that physicians under-report
adverse events to the FDA’s system and that such reports are only the “‘proverbial tip of the
iceberg of drug reactions and interactions’” (quoting Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug Reactions:
Harnessing Experiential Data to Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 449, 469
(2000))); Parasidis, supra note 22, at 950–51 (noting that adverse event data reported voluntarily
“account[s] for less than five percent of all reported adverse events”).
78. See Manfred Hauben et al., ‘Extreme Duplication’ in the US FDA Adverse Events
Reporting System Database, 30 DRUG SAFETY 551, 551–54 (2007) (describing how a scientific
study found that the data in the FDA’s AERS database is highly duplicated and identifying some
explanations for such duplication).
79. See Lanh Green, Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology, Presentation to the 42nd
Annual Meeting of the Drug Information Association: Postmarketing Pharmacovigilance Practice
at FDA (June 21, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Centers
Offices/CDER/ucm119101.pdf (citing both the failure to report adverse events and the
duplication in reporting by multiple sources—e.g., manufacturers and healthcare
professionals—as skewing the true number of adverse events associated with a medication).
80. See, e.g., Parasidis, supra note 22, at 951 (“[F]rom an epidemiological standpoint, ‘the
FDA does not know how many people are using the drug’ and does not have adequate
information about those who are.” (quoting David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical
Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 490
(2008))).
81. See Adequacy of FDA Hearings, supra note 14, at 60 (statement of Steven E. Nissen,
Chairman, Department of Cardiovascular Medicine, Cleveland Clinic Foundation) (“The
post-marketing surveillance system for drugs and devices functions poorly. Adverse event
reporting is voluntary and studies show that only 1 to 10 percent of serious adverse events are
ever reported to the agency. Accordingly, the actual incidence of serious or life-threatening
complications cannot be calculated accurately.”); see also FDA Adverse Event Reporting System,
supra note 37 (“[The] FDA does not receive reports for every adverse event or medical error that
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Further complicating matters, adverse-event data does not account for
confounding factors such as concomitant medications being taken by the
patient and the attendant risks associated with those drugs.82 Additionally, the
data neither provides for the overall health profile of the patient83 nor serves as
proof that the patient actually suffered the reported injury.84 Therefore,

occurs with a product. Many factors can influence whether or not an event will be reported, such
as the time a product has been marketed and publicity about an event. Therefore, FAERS data
cannot be used to calculate the incidence of an adverse event . . . in the U.S. population.”).
Moreover, even when adverse events are timely reported to the FDA, additional problems with
assessment of the data can arise because the FDA does not require electronic submission of
adverse event reports. See Adverse Events Reporting System (FAERS) Electronic Submissions,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegula
toryInformation/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/ucm115894.htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2012)
(noting that electronic submissions of adverse effect reports are encouraged for their efficiency
and cost-effectiveness). For those reports submitted on paper forms, data is manually coded into
the AERS database, creating the potential for human error that an adverse event will be
misclassified. See Postmarketing Safety Reports for Human Drug and Biological Products;
Electronic Submission Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 42,184, 42,188 (proposed Aug. 21, 2009)
(finding that conversion of paper-submitted reports to an electronic form is time consuming,
expensive, and open to error); see also PDUFA White Paper, supra note 62 (stating that over
100,000 manufacturers’ reports must be converted to the FDA’s electronic database).
“The FDA’s inability to calculate ‘the true frequency of adverse events in the
population,’ . . . ‘makes it hard to establish the magnitude of a safety problem, and it makes
comparisons of risks across similar drugs difficult.’” Laakmann, supra note 60, at 338 (quoting
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-402, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN
FDA’S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESSES 24–25 (2006)). As the
FDA itself stated in discussing the evaluation of safety signals: “Like the proverbial search for a
needle in a haystack, the number and variety of reports, together with the number and variety of
products and the lack of reliable usage information, make it difficult to distinguish variability and
noise from a real concern.” FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MANAGING THE RISK FROM MEDICAL PRODUCT USE: CREATING A RISK MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK 67 (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/safety/safetyofspecific
products/ucm180520.pdf.
82. Although Form FDA 3500A asks the manufacturer to list all concomitant medications
being used by the patient at the time of the adverse event, the report and the FDA analyst
reviewing it are unable to distinguish which drug, if any, actually caused the event. FORM FDA
3500A, supra note 64, at 1, 9.
83. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH (CDER), CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS
EVALUATION & RESEARCH (CBER), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: POSTMARKETING SAFETY REPORTING FOR HUMAN DRUG
AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS INCLUDING VACCINES (DRAFT) 38–39 (2001) [hereinafter DRAFT
POSTMARKETING SAFETY REPORTING], available at http://www.fda.gov/download
s/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Guidance-ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/Vaccines/uc
m092257.pdf (stating that medical records are not included with adverse event reports).
84. For example, unverified claims of adverse drug experiences on which a lawsuit against a
prescription drug manufacturer is premised nonetheless create an obligation on the part of the
manufacturer to report those claimed events to the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b)–(c) (2012)
(obligating manufacturers to review and report “all adverse drug experience information obtained
or otherwise received by the applicant from any source, foreign or domestic” (emphasis added));
see also, e.g., DRAFT POSTMARKETING SAFETY REPORTING, supra note 83, at 8 (requiring only
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alternative causation theories cannot be dismissed.85 Accordingly, case reports
do not provide sufficient information to determine a causal association
between medication and adverse event.86
Before 2007, the FDA’s principal postmarketing surveillance method could
not reasonably demonstrate that an identified risk in fact bore any association
to the medication at issue.87 Even when the FDA identified a potential health
risk through the AERS database, it could not require or suggest a labeling
change to the manufacturer on that basis alone.88 Pursuant to agency guidance
documents, the FDA could only ask manufacturers to “evaluate individual case
reports for clinical content and completeness . . . [and] look for features that
may suggest a causal relationship between the use of a product and the adverse

knowledge of an identifiable patient, reporter, suspect drug, and adverse outcome to trigger a
reporting obligation on the part of the manufacturer).
85. Some critics of the FDA’s adverse-event reporting system suggest that voluntary reports
issued from the point of care will be written to shift blame from the provider to the manufacturer,
which can result in an erroneous perception of an increased number of adverse events attributable
to the product itself, rather than to user error. See e.g., James T. O’Reilly, Pin the Tail on the
Other Donkey: Allocating and Avoiding Injury Losses After Drug or Device Approval, 62 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 559, 562 (2007) (“The Medwatch form [3500A] sets the choice: ‘Product Problem’
or ‘Product Use Error;’ the device or drug’s failed result in the clinical setting is more likely to be
attributed by the hospital risk manager to a ‘failed’ product.” (citation omitted)). But conversely,
with consumers increasingly able to obtain prescription drugs over the Internet, the possibility
that many adverse drug experiences will go unreported, due to the lack of physician involvement,
increases exponentially. See Bryan A. Liang & Tim Mackey, Searching for Safety: Addressing
Search Engine, Website, and Provider Accountability for Illicit Online Drug Sales, 35 AM. J.L.
& MED. 125, 128–31 (2009).
86. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) (defining “adverse drug experience” as “[a]ny adverse
event associated with the use of a drug in humans, whether or not considered drug related”)
(emphasis added), with GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES, supra note 73, at 4 (stating that
the “actual risk to patients cannot be known from [adverse event] data because it is not possible to
characterize all events definitively and because there is invariably under-reporting of some extent
and incomplete information about duration of therapy, numbers treated, etc.”). See also Rider v.
Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that case reports are only
reported data and not based on any scientific methodology); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947
F. Supp. 1387, 1411 (D. Or. 1996) (stating that the lack of controls in case reports makes them
unreliable as scientific means of establishing causation); Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp.
1160, 1165 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (noting that case reports cannot replace scientific studies); Casey v.
Ohio Med. Prods., 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that case reports do not
provide reliable scientific evidence of causation).
87. See 153 CONG. REC. 25,162–63 (2007) (statement of Sen. Michael Enzi) (stating that
the FDA has no active surveillance system in place to monitor adverse events and that its ability
to monitor a drug is curbed after it has entered the market).
88. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2012) (requiring reasonable evidence of a causal
association); see also GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES, supra note 73, at 8 (“Data
mining is not a tool for establishing causal attributions between products and adverse events.”).
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event.”89 The guidance documents, however, did not create legal obligations
and manufacturers were free to decline the FDA’s suggestions.90
Although binding, federal regulations governing AERS proved similarly
ill-equipped to direct an investigation into the reported event’s cause.91 Until
2007, federal regulations did not affirmatively empower the FDA to require
manufacturers to conduct postmarketing clinical trials following identification
of potential health risks from AERS data.92 Although 21 C.F.R § 314.80
requires that manufacturers promptly investigate serious and unexpected
adverse events,93 it does not require a manufacturer to determine the event’s
causation.94 Thus, as with FDA guidance documents, the FDA lacked the
power to force manufacturers to discover the causal association in order to
effect labeling changes.95
Moreover, depending on the adverse effect’s severity and whether it was
already listed on the product’s label, a manufacturer may not report the event
for months or years.96 Consequently, the FDA could operate for a significant

89. GOOD PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES, supra note 73, at 6.
90. Id. at 1 (explicating that the guidance documents did not mandate any action and should
be viewed as recommendations only).
91. See The Public’s Stake in Adverse Event Reporting, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/AdverseDru
gEffects/ucm179586.htm (last updated Aug. 20, 2009) (finding that other causes, and not just a
drug, may also lead to an adverse event).
92. See Evans, supra note 1, at 478–79 (detailing the FDAAA’s expansion of the FDA’s
powers); see also infra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
93. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(1)(i)–(ii) (2012) (requiring manufacturers to “promptly
investigate all [serious and unexpected] adverse drug experiences” and “submit followup reports
within 15 calendar days of receipt of new information or as requested by [the] FDA”); see also id.
§ 314.80(c)(2)(i) (describing reporting requirements for nonserious and expected adverse events).
94. See id. § 314.80(c)(1)(ii) (acknowledging that, “[i]f additional information is not
obtainable, records should be maintained of the unsuccessful steps taken to seek additional
information”); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE PROGRAM GUIDANCE
MANUAL
ch.
53,
pt.
V,
at
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/UCM332013.
pdf (requiring manufacturers to follow up on unexpected and serious adverse events but
declining to require ultimate proof of causation).
95. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (stating that, before 2007, the FDA could not
require manufacturers to conduct follow-up trials during the postmarketing stage to determine
whether a drug caused potential side effects that were previously unknown).
96. The Code of Federal Regulations defines a “serious adverse drug experience” as one
that “results in” death or other life-threatening injury. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) (2012). Because
case reports do not demonstrate causation, whether the experience resulted in the injury may be
open to debate. This could potentially cause a serious event to be misclassified and reported
much later than what the regulations require for serious and unexpected events. See, e.g., id.
§ 314.80(c)(2)(i) (permitting manufacturers to delay reporting of all nonserious or expected
adverse events for as many as twelve months from receipt of information).
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period of time under the assumption that a potential risk did not exist when, in
fact, the drug manufacturer possessed contradictory data.97
Even if sufficient postmarketing data existed to prove a causal association
between a drug and a side effect,98 before 2007 the FDA lacked the power to
force a labeling change.99 Rather, the FDA could only suggest modifications,
which typically resulted in protracted negotiations with the manufacturer,100
which delayed, or even prevented, the dissemination of updated warnings to
Although the FDA could withdraw a
physicians and the public.101
medication’s marketing approval if the manufacturer refused labeling

97. See, e.g., Letter from Pub. Health Serv., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gregory Irace,
President and Chief Exec. Officer, Sanofi-Aventis (Jan. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ENforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm243585.htm (issuing a
warning letter to Sanofi-Aventis after discovering that the pharmaceutical company was
potentially 896 days late in reporting a drug’s adverse effects to the FDA). Reports of serious
risks need not be reported to the FDA in the fifteen-day window if that risk is already reflected in
the labeling. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c).
98. This information would have to come from sources other than AERS data, such as data
from clinical trials.
99. In testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, the acting director of
the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research admitted the FDA’s lack of authority to
require Merck to modify its labeling for Vioxx:
Mr. WAXMAN. I want to go back to that give and take of the FDA negotiating
changes in the label with the company. It seems like you had what you thought ought to
be disclosed and the company did not quite agree with it, and you are not in a position
legally to order it, even though you thought the public and the doctors ought to have
this, particularly the doctors ought to have this warning information in light of the new
studies.
Dr. GALSON. Right.
Risk and Responsibility Hearing, supra note 3, at 64 (exchange between Rep. Henry A. Waxman,
Member, H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Steven Galson, Acting Director, Center for Drug
Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug Administration); see also id. at 40 (statement of
Steven Galson, Acting Director, Center for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug
Administration) (noting, in response to the question why the FDA could not dictate labeling
changes to Merck for its medication Vioxx, that “[t]he label by law belongs to the product, which
belongs to the company [and] we can work together with [the manufacturer and] . . . most of the
time we are very, very successful in getting what we want”).
100. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH (CDER), CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS
EVALUATION & RESEARCH (CBER), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAFETY LABELING CHANGES—IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECTION 505(O)(4) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (DRAFT) 2 (2011)
[hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAFETY LABELING CHANGES], available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/U
CM250783.pdf.
101. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Official Admits ‘Lapses’ on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 2005, at A15 (citing the FDA’s Deputy Director of the Office of New Drugs as stating that the
FDA took too long to obtain information about health risks onto its Vioxx label and blaming the
manufacturer for the delay).
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recommendations, the agency admitted that it would rarely exercise such
authority when there were patients benefitting from the drug.102
B. Improved Detection Through the FDAAA and Sentinel System
The changes made in the drug safety components of [the FDAAA]
are critical to restoring peace of mind to Americans who want to be
assured that the drugs they take to treat illnesses and chronic medical
conditions can be relied upon and trusted.
—Sen. Michael Enzi, R-Wyo.103
We cannot wait another month, another week—or even another day.
We must take action here and take action now to send [the FDAAA]
to the President.
—Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.104
In 2007, Congress took action to rectify the shortcomings of the FDA’s
postmarketing surveillance of pharmaceutical products, overwhelmingly voting
in favor of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007.105
The FDAAA authorized the FDA to require drug manufacturers to conduct
postmarketing clinical studies and trials to assess a medication’s known and
potential risks and identify additional, serious risks.106 In direct response to the
limitations of the AERS database, the FDAAA ordered the creation of a
national healthcare data network—the Sentinel System—that was to comprise,
by July 1, 2012, data from no less than 100 million patients.107 Further, the
FDAAA granted the FDA the authority to order labeling changes upon the
discovery of “new safety information,” and it created civil penalties for

102. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAFETY LABELING CHANGES, supra note 100, at 2; see also
Evans, supra note 1, at 504; Barbara J. Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model of Medical
Privacy, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 632–33 (2009).
103. 153 CONG. REC. 25,162–63 (2007) (statement of Sen. Michael Enzi).
104. 153 CONG. REC. 25,037 (2007) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
105. The FDAAA passed through the House of Representatives by a vote of 405 to 7 and was
approved unanimously in the Senate. See 153 CONG. REC. 24,773 (2007); see also 153 CONG.
REC. 25,048 (2007). The bill was signed into law on September 27, 2007. Press Release, The
White House Office of Commc’ns, President Bush Signs H.R. 2669 and H.R. 3580 into Law
(Sept. 27, 2007).
106. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3) (Supp. IV 2011). The FDAAA authorizes the FDA to require
manufacturers to conduct postmarketing studies “[t]o assess a known serious risk related to the
use of the drug involved”; “[t]o assess signals of serious risk related to the use of the drug”; and
“[t]o identify an unexpected serious risk when available data indicates the potential for a serious
risk.” Id. § 355(o)(3)(B); see also Faden & Milne, supra note 36, at 688. Importantly, the
FDAAA further empowers the FDA with authority to levy monetary sanctions against
manufacturers that refuse to conduct such postmarketing studies and trials. 21 U.S.C.
§ 333(f)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 2011) (providing civil monetary penalties of up to $250,000 for single
violations limited to $1 million per proceeding, with an increase of up to $10 million when the
responsible party continues the violation after receiving notice from the Secretary).
107. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (Supp. IV 2011).
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violations of such orders.108 The Act was the largest reform in half a
century.109
The FDAAA rejects the concept that preclinical trials could identify all of a
medication’s potential side effects, thereby shifting the FDA’s regulatory focus
to identifying risks after marketing approval.110 As noted by one scholar, the
FDA’s role as the market’s gatekeeper acknowledges the reality that some
products will enter the market with latent risks.111 The FDAAA is relevant
because it “adds [the] capability to detect and manage risks after products pass
through the gate.”112
Working in conjunction with the AERS database,113 the Sentinel System
allows the FDA to query patient healthcare data when a drug’s safety is in
question.114 In order to rule out alternative causation theories, the FDA can
now use the Sentinel System to pursue the question of causation by searching
100 million patients’ healthcare data to determine a drug’s users, the users’
overall health profiles (including concomitant medications), and the side
effects experienced.115 The benefits of this system are exponential:
With claims data for 100 million people, the [Vioxx] problem could
have been spotted in fewer than 3 months. If [the] FDA had had the
necessary data networks in place to do large-scale observational
studies in 1999, all of the people killed or injured by Cox-2
painkillers after August 1999 (i.e., three months after Vioxx went on
sale) might have been spared.116

108. Id. § 355(o)(4)(E).
109. See Evans, supra note 1, at 422–23 (quoting Mark McClellan, Drug Safety Reform at
the FDA—Pendulum Swing or Systematic Improvement?, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1700, 1700
(2007)).
110. See id. at 457–58 (stating that the FDA’s pre-1962 evidentiary paradigm, with its
reliance on premarketing trials for determining adverse effects, was “beyond repair”).
111. Id. at 477 (arguing that safety is not compromised by reacting to postmarketing reports).
112. Id. (“The gate is intrinsically porous, . . . key constituencies such as the medical
profession and academics overestimated the power of premarket testing and consequently showed
‘little, if any, leadership’ in developing and using postmarket risk-benefit data. In [the] FDAAA,
Congress has supplied the missing leadership.” (quoting Kenneth L. Melmon, Attitudinal Factors
that Influence the Utilization of Modern Evaluative Methods, in INST. OF MED., MODERN
METHODS OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 135, 144 (Annetine C. Gelijns ed., 1990))).
113. SENTINEL 2010 REPORT, supra note 59, at 2 (asserting that the Sentinel System will
augment the FDA’s current postmarket surveillance systems).
114. Id. at 3 (calling this monitoring “active surveillance”).
115. See Evans, supra note 102, at 588–89 (noting that the Sentinel System will provide the
ability to examine a patient’s entire medical record to conclusively determine whether a drug’s
ingestion caused an adverse effect). But cf. supra notes 73–86 and accompanying text (noting the
FDA’s inability to determine the true incidence rate of a newly identified side effect based solely
on adverse event reports).
116. Evans, supra note 1, at 456 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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This statement assumes, however, that review of the Vioxx patients’ claims
data would have been focused on the adverse health effect at issue.117
Ultimately, although the Sentinel System’s use of active postmarketing
surveillance will discover postmarketing health effects faster, the possibility of
eliminating those effects entirely is not feasible.118
C. Cracks in the Façade: The FDAAA’s 10,000-Patient Donut Hole
Despite the FDAAA’s significant leap forward in postmarketing
surveillance, the Sentinel System has value only if some percentage of patients
experience a previously undetected adverse event during the postmarketing
period.119 Even post-FDAAA, some lag time between marketing and health
risk detection will persist.120 To Congress’s credit, it did not shy away from
these facts in drafting the Act; it embraced them.121
The FDAAA directs the FDA to conduct routine surveillance of newly
approved drugs122 and the AERS database,123 and then report its findings to the
public.124 For all newly approved medications, the FDA must publicly report,
“by 18 months after approval of a drug or after use of the drug by 10,000
individuals, whichever is later, . . . any new risks not previously identified,
117. Cf. id. at 441 (noting that knowledge about what possible adverse effects might occur is
necessary to assess safety data drawn from clinical trials).
118. SENTINEL 2010 REPORT, supra note 59, at 4.
119. See Evans, supra note 1, at 453 (arguing that a larger sample size provides more
accurate data).
120. For the FDA’s post hoc analysis of postmarketing surveillance data to have any effect,
analysts must have predetermined criteria to which their review is targeted. See, e.g., id. at 441.
Until these targeted criteria are determined, preliminary reviews of Sentinel System data must
first identify the potential unknown risks, with later analysis devoted to incidence rates and
severity, creating an inherent delay in identifying, assessing, and warning of newly discovered
risks. More generally, the FDA cannot simply release all adverse-event data immediately upon
discovery. A due diligence period is required to substantiate the noted effect. See, e.g., Kristen
Rosati, Using Electronic Health Information for Pharmacovigilance: The Promise and the
Pitfalls, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 171, 229–30 (2009) (“Drug safety ‘signals’ may be observed
in an analysis, often requiring follow-up to obtain more information to confirm causation, such as
comparing the findings across multiple information sources to confirm the validity of the
conclusions. During the ‘gray zone’ that exists between the first drug safety signal and
confirmation (or refutation) of the signal’s validity, pharmacovigilance experts are wary about
communicating their findings to others. False positives run the risk of alarming patients,
potentially causing them to stop medication therapy that may have real benefit to them.”).
121. 153 CONG. REC. S11,833 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2007) (statement of Sen. Michael Enzi)
(stating that the FDAAA strengthens the FDA’s ability to address postmarketing drug safety).
122. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(E) (Supp. IV 2011).
123. Id. § 355(k)(5) (requiring the FDA to screen the AERS system bi-weekly and to post
quarterly reports detailing any new safety information found within the previous quarter).
124. See, e.g., id. § 355(r)(1) (“[The FDA] shall improve the transparency of information
about drugs and allow patients and health care providers better access to information about drugs
by developing and maintaining an Internet Web site that . . . improves communication of drug
safety information to patients and providers.”).
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potential new risks, or known risks reported in unusual number.”125 Implicit in
these requirements, however, is that the new data comes at the expense of a
drug’s first subscribers who suffer the unknown adverse effects.126
Mandated surveillance and public disclosure of postmarketing safety data
are critical to reassure the public about an approved drug’s safety and to
expedite updated warnings to both consumers and healthcare professionals.127
Further, surveillance and disclosure complement the FDA’s newly prescribed
authority to require updated labeling of pharmaceutical products by creating a
framework through which “new safety information”128 will be promptly
identified.129 More subtly and controversially, however, the FDAAA provides
a de facto post-approval clinical trial for all new drugs, involving no fewer
than 10,000 participants and conducted during the first eighteen months after
market approval.130
1. Protections Afforded Clinical Trial Participants
Clinical trials are an essential pillar of the drug approval process.131 Before
a new drug can be marketed in the United States, the FDA must first find that
the drug is both safe and effective132 and that its benefits outweigh its risks.133
These criteria are proved through the mandatory human clinical trials that are
typically conducted in three phrases.134 Phase I trials assess side effects
associated with the drug and how the drug is metabolized in the human
body.135 Less than 100 individuals participate in these trials.136 Conversely,
125. Id. § 355(r)(2)(D).
126. See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text.
127. See SENTINEL 2010 REPORT, supra note 59, at 2; see also Evans, supra note 102, at 590;
Ralph F. Hall, The Risk of Risk Reduction: Can Postmarket Surveillance Pose More Risk than
Benefit?, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 473, 474 (2007); Lance L. Shea et al., Cause and Effect?
Assessing Postmarketing Safety Studies as Evidence of Causation in Products Liability Cases, 62
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445, 446 (2007).
128. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 2011).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 355(r)(2)(D).
131. See Anna B. Laakmann, Collapsing the Distinction Between Experimentation and
Treatment in the Regulation of New Drugs, 62 ALA. L. REV. 305, 315 (2011).
132. 21 C.F.R. § 314.2 (2012).
133. Id. §§ 314.2, 314.105, 314.125 (2012); see also Rebecca S. Yoshitani & Ellen S.
Cooper, Pharmaceutical Reformulation: The Growth of Life Cycle Management, 7 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 379, 382 (2007) (stating that, in order to receive FDA approval, clinical
studies must prove a drug’s safety and effectiveness and must show that the risks in its
consumption are less than the benefits gained).
134. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2011); see also W. Christopher Matton & F. Scott Thomas, The
Continuing Balance: Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS 283, 297–98 (2004)
(concluding that each phase increases the number of participants and, therefore, the quality of
data).
135. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a).
136. Id. (finding the number generally to be between twenty and eighty participants).
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Phase II trials are concerned with the drug’s effectiveness for its specified
use.137 Phase II trials are relatively small but larger than Phase I, involving
less than 1,000 patients.138 Phase III trials gather additional information on the
drug’s safety and effectiveness so that the drug’s benefit/risk relationship can
be assessed.139 Phase III trials are the largest, comprising several hundred or
several thousand participants.140
Since 1970, manufacturers have conducted postmarketing (Phase IV)
clinical trials on FDA-approved medications.141 Phase IV trials assess the
drug’s efficacy and safety over long-term administration and also examine the
benefits of alternative dosages, including “use of the drug in other patient
populations or other stages of the disease.”142 Although some suggest that the
FDA ostensibly mandated early Phase IV trials as a condition of a drug’s
approval,143 the authority to order such studies was premised on an unstable
regulatory foundation until passage of the FDAAA144 and was seldom
invoked.145 With the passage of the FDAAA, however, the FDA can now
require a drug manufacturer to conduct postmarketing clinical trials upon
identification of “new safety information” obtained in the post-approval
period.146
All clinical research is governed by federal regulations,147 which provide
significant protections to clinical trial participants.148 Pursuant to regulations
137. Id. § 312.21(b).
138. Id. (finding the number to be no more than several hundred participants).
139. Id. § 312.21(c).
140. Id.
141. Steenburg, supra note 24, at 300.
142. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 312.85 (2011) (stating that it took seven years after passing the
Kefauver-Harris Amendments for the FDA to require a Phase IV study).
143. Steenburg, supra note 24, at 300 (noting approval of Parkinson’s drug Levodopa on the
condition that certain long-term studies continue after approval).
144. See id. at 301 (noting that the FDA worked to codify Phase IV studies by promulgating
a rule); see also Evans, supra note 1, at 477–79 (stating that the FDA claimed it had those
extended powers before the FDAAA but had exercised them with caution because they were not
expressly granted).
145. Evans, supra note 1, at 478. In 1992, the FDA formally adopted regulations
empowering it to require postmarketing studies, albeit under specified and limited circumstances,
for drugs addressing serious or life-threatening injury. 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2011). In 1997,
Congress codified FDA regulations requiring postmarketing trials in this context. 21 U.S.C.
§ 356(a)(2)(a) (2006).
146. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(C) (Supp. IV 2011). The FDAAA defines new safety
information to include: “information derived from a clinical trial, an adverse event report, a
postapproval study . . . ; data derived from the postmarket risk identification and analysis
[Sentinel] system”; or “other scientific data deemed appropriate” by the FDA about a serious risk
“that [FDA] has become aware of . . . since the drug was approved.” 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(3)
(Supp. IV 2011).
147. 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2011); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101(a)(2), 46.102(e) (2011); Matton
& Thomas, supra note 134, at 316 (concerning “protection of human subjects”).
148. See infra notes 149–55 and accompanying text.
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promulgated by the FDA149 and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS),150 a new drug’s clinical trial research conducted in support of
market approval must minimize all potential risks “[b]y using procedures
[that] . . . do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk,” and which
“[r]isks . . . are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits.”151 Moreover,
trial sponsors must obtain participants’ informed consent before conducting the
trial.152 This consent must include a statement to the participant that contains
“[a] description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the
subject”; “[a] disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of
treatment, if any, that might be advantageous to the subject”; and, when
appropriate, “[a] statement that the particular treatment or procedure may
involve risks to the subject . . . which are currently unforeseeable.”153 If the
trial involves more than minimal risk, the sponsor must disclose information
regarding compensation and medical treatments that may be required should
injury result.154 Beyond regulatory protections, trial sponsors can also obtain
insurance policies to compensate trial participants for injuries incurred during
the trial.155
2. Protections Denied First Subscribers Post-FDAAA
As previously mentioned, one significant component of the FDAAA’s new
postmarketing surveillance regime is its requirement that the FDA publicly
report an analysis of those reports identifying a new drug’s adverse reactions
received after the drug’s marketing approval.156 In compiling and assessing
information for the new drug’s initial summary analyses, the FDA will use
both its old, passive AERS system and the new, active Sentinel System.157
Moreover, the FDA intends to prioritize its active surveillance using data
obtained through postmarketing surveillance sources such as adverse event
149. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1(a), 56.101(a) (2011) (outlining the scope of protections afforded).
150. See 45 C.F.R. 46.101(a) (2011).
151. 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(1)–(2) (2011); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)–(2) (2011).
152. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2011); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011).
153. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2), (4); § 46.116(b)(1) (emphasis added); see also 21 C.F.R.
§ 50.25(a)–(b) (2011).
154. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(6). As defined in the regulations,
“[m]inimal risk means that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the
research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or
during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.” 21 C.F.R.
§ 56.102(i) (2011) (emphasis added); 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2011) (emphasis added).
155. But see William M. Sage, Some Principles Require Principals: Why Banning “Conflicts
of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive Problems in Biomedical Research, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1413, 1453
(2007) (noting that, “unlike other countries, the United States does not require research
institutions to have clinical trials insurance, and compensation policies for research injuries are
erratic and incomplete”).
156. 21 U.S.C. § 355(r)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 2011).
157. See, e.g., id. § 355(r)(2)(C)–(D); SENTINEL 2010 REPORT, supra note 59, at 2 (stating
that this creates a more comprehensive system).
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reports158 to identify previously unknown risks.159 In outlining what would
become the Sentinel System, the FDAAA required the FDA to establish
procedures to identify and report trends in the data to the Secretary of HHS.160
Consequently, the FDA must conduct observational studies by querying the
Sentinel System for adverse drug reaction reports on a drug’s first
subscribers.161 Whether this activity rises to the level of a clinical trial is
debatable,162 but the distinction may be irrelevant.163 There is no dispute that
the FDA’s conduct in querying the Sentinel System based on adverse reaction
reports observes individuals taking a specified medication and measures
outcomes.164 Conversely, whether or not the FDA’s data can be viewed as
observational clinical trials, the queries are necessarily systematic
investigations involving human subjects “designed to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge” about a drug.165
Because the queries into the Sentinel System data contribute to the FDA’s
understanding of a drug’s risks, the question remains whether these first
subscribers should receive the same protections as those of postmarketing
clinical trial participants.166 Unlike trial participants, early subscribers to an
FDA-approved drug are not required to receive information regarding

158. SENTINEL 2010 REPORT, supra note 59, at 3 (“[The] FDA will prioritize safety
questions that have emerged from premarket or postmarket safety data sources (e.g., clinical trial
data, spontaneous adverse event reports) and submit them to a Coordinating Center for evaluation
by data partners that are part of Sentinel’s ‘distributed system.’”).
159. 21 U.S.C. § 355(r)(2)(D).
160. Id. § 355 (k)(3)(C)(i)(IV)–(V). The procedures used would assure data dissemination in
a timely manner, all while considering its comprehensiveness and standardization. Id.
§ 355(k)(3)(C)(ii).
161. See Evans, supra note 1, at 507; see also Surveillance: Post Drug-Approval Activities,
supra note 58.
162. Understanding Clinical Trials, U.S. NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://clinicaltrials.gov
/ct2/info/understand#Q19 (last reviewed Aug. 2012).
163. See supra notes 147–48, 156 and accompanying text.
164. See SENTINEL 2010 REPORT, supra note 59, at 3 (discussing methods employed by the
Sentinel System).
165. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2011). Some may argue that the FDA’s Sentinel System queries
are exempt from HHS guidelines because they involve “the collection or study of existing data,
documents, records,” and, therefore, are exempt from HHS policies on the protection of human
research subjects. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2011). Although the argument appears plausible, it
misses the point. Without those early subscribers to the medication, whose injuries make the
FDA’s queries possible, the FDA would not have a basis to conduct the search. The information
exists only because patients were allowed to take a newly approved medication without first
receiving the protections afforded trial participants. But see Evans, supra note 102, at 626–27
(arguing that neither FDA nor HHS regulations apply to patient data “that are fully identified,
identifiable by researchers, coded, or de-identified/anonymized”).
166. Evans, supra note 1, at 456 (noting that relying on postmarket drug studies to detect
risks poses ethical problems because the participants may become ill).
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alternative treatments or disclosures of potentially unknown risks.167 Likewise,
because subscription to a newly approved medication can pose potentially
significant risks, early subscribers would not receive the same compensation or
medical treatment that clinical trial participants would receive should injury
occur.168
The rationale behind the FDAAA’s passage lies in the inevitability of
postmarketing discovery of adverse health risks that could not have been
identified during the pre-approval clinical trial phases.169 As scholars and
members of Congress have correctly noted, a compromise between expediency
and safety must be reached in the drug approval process.170 The FDAAA
acknowledges that previously unknown side effects will be discovered
postmarketing.171 Therefore, the question arises as to how first subscribers
injured during the postmarketing period should be compensated.172
II. AN ARGUMENT AGAINST EITHER TORT LITIGATION OR THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY PROVIDING RELIEF FOLLOWING UNLABELED POSTMARKETING
INJURIES
By expanding the FDA’s postmarketing surveillance authority, the FDAAA
has created a void filled with unprotected patients.173 First subscribers do not
receive the disclosures, possible compensation, or healthcare provided to trial
participants.174 Nor do they benefit from long-term study of a drug that
identifies the medication’s health risks.175 These first subscribers, constituting
the first 10,000+ FDAAA-designated users, do not willingly agree to
exploratory treatment.176 Moreover, their physicians are not sufficiently
informed of all the medication’s risks because they are still being discovered at

167. The warnings afforded participants in clinical trials pursuant to federal regulations do
not apply to postmarket studies because the drug has already been approved. See 45 C.F.R
§ 45.116(a) (2011).
168. See INST. OF MED., ETHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN STUDYING THE SAFETY OF
APPROVED DRUGS 172 (2012) (discussing the ethical issues associated with postmarket drug
studies because risks and benefits associated with taking certain FDA-approved drugs need not be
weighed evenly).
169. Evans, supra note 1, at 425 (noting that the pretrial evidentiary data’s weight is being
reassessed).
170. See, e.g., id. at 456 (asking whether it is ethical to expose patients to drugs for which
some side effects may be unknown); see also 153 CONG. REC. 25,037 (2007) (statement of Sen.
Edward Kennedy).
171. See Evans, supra note 1, at 443 (noting the inherent shortcomings of premarket drug
clinical studies to detect all side effects).
172. Cf. id. at 456 (stating that reliance on postmarket drug studies to detect risks poses
ethical problems).
173. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 167.
175. See Evans, supra note 1, at 477.
176. See id. at 456.
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their patients’ expense.177 Thus, these first subscribers and their physicians
cannot weigh the treatment’s risks and benefits when some of those risks are
unknown.178 When injuries occur, first subscribers are left with two equally
insufficient and unappealing options: tort litigation and health insurance
claims.179 For the following reasons, neither of these options is sufficient.180
A. The Inherent Inequality of Recovery from Litigation
Recovery under tort law requires the injured party to prove both causation
and the manufacturer’s liability for the injury.181 Unfortunately, in the context
of adverse health effects first discovered during the postmarketing period,
finding proof of causation can be problematic and establishing liability
exceedingly difficult.182 As a result, using tort law remedies to provide relief
from newly discovered adverse health effects is, at the individual level, limited
at best.183 Moreover, when this type of relief is expanded to society as a whole
(e.g., in cases where similar adverse health effects are experienced by multiple
users), additional concerns regarding unequal treatment of similarly situated
parties arise, further diluting tort law’s overall effectiveness at compensating
injuries.184
Generally, under products liability laws, a business that sells or distributes a
defective product is subject to liability for harm that the product causes.185
Traditionally, the bases for a products liability cause of action include a claim
that the product was defectively manufactured, defectively designed, or not
accompanied by proper instructions and warnings.186 In drug litigation,

177. See id. at 477 (noting that the Sentinel System’s efficacy is predicated on the discovery
of unknown side effects during the postmarket study period).
178. See id.
179. See O’Reilly, supra note 85, at 567; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCT LIABILITY § 1 (1998) (noting the availability in tort to recover for defective products).
180. See infra Part II.A–B.
181. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a; see also In re
Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 699 F. Supp. 233, 236 (D. Haw. 1988) (stating that the plaintiff need
only show that the product was defective and a proximate cause of the harm), aff’d, 960 F.2d 906
(9th Cir. 1992).
182. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 1, at 457 (arguing that finding late-emerging risks is an
unreasonable expectation, but the public believes that these should be discovered before a drug’s
approval).
183. David G. Owen, Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling a Private Law Gap in the
Healthcare Debate, 42 CONN. L. REV. 733, 738 (2010) (noting that one area of unsettled law
relating to prescription drugs is the extent of manufacturers’ liability when unforeseeable dangers
are present).
184. See, e.g., O’Reilly, supra note 85, at 569 (arguing that even patients who take the
allegedly defective drug must show that it was the drug that caused the injury and not something
else).
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.
186. See, e.g., id. § 2.
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failure-to-warn claims largely predominate.187 Although an injured party may
choose to pursue warning claims under strict liability, negligence, or breach of
warranty theories of liability,188 courts typically apply a negligence standard in
assessing the warning’s validity189 by relying on the concept of
foreseeability.190 Foreseeability requires the plaintiff to prove that the
manufacturer was aware, or should have been aware, of the risk of the injury
sustained and failed to warn of it.191
Because an adverse health effect that is discovered after marketing approval
is, by definition, previously unknown to the manufacturer,192 the patient
sustaining the injury almost certainly will be unable to recover under any
applicable tort theory.193 State products liability laws are virtually uniform in
187. See Owen, supra note 183, at 751 (detailing several warning issues that tend to arise in
drug cases); see also Rosati, supra note 120, at 231 (characterizing improperly labeled drugs as
“defective”).
188. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n; Owen, supra note
183, at 752.
189. Owen, supra note 183, at 752–53 & n.77 (citing cases in which courts have applied a
negligence standard).
190. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. m(2) (1998)
(stating that most jurisdictions find a duty to warn of risks where those risks were known or
should have been known to a reasonable person).
191. See, e.g., Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 450 N.Y.S.2d 615, 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (“Where
the theory of liability is failure to warn or adequately instruct, negligence and strict products
liability are equivalent causes of action.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 2 cmt. m(2) (proposing that there is little substantive difference between the terms
“reasonableness” and negligence with respect to strict liability claims). Because failure to warn
claims generally include some element of foreseeability, a breach of warranty theory is similar to
its strict liability and negligence counterparts because all three require some type of actual or
constructive knowledge of the risk imputed to the manufacturer. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n. Moreover, those states that do not require proof of
actual or constructive knowledge of the risk nevertheless require the plaintiff to prove that
knowledge of the risk was known by or available to others. See, e.g., Livingston v. Isuzu Motors,
LTD., 910 F. Supp. 1473, 1497 (D. Mont. 1995).
192. Because this Article focuses on the FDA’s improved efforts to detect previously
unknown health risks during the postmarketing period, for purposes of this section, this Article
assumes that the discovery during the postmarketing period of the adverse effect is legitimate and
not the result of deliberate obfuscation by the manufacturer or lack of diligence in researching the
risks of the product at issue. In such cases, an injured party would potentially be more likely to
succeed in tort in obtaining relief from the manufacturer. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d
364, 369–70 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the
manufacturer had sufficient evidence of a potential risk such that its failure to supplement the
warnings for its drug misled physicians).
193. See LaMontagne v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d 846, 859 (2d Cir. 1994)
(affirming a lower court’s finding that the defendant was not required to warn of the risks
associated with its product because the Connecticut products liability law for failure to warn is
grounded in “the fundamental principle that a seller’s duty to warn is premised on the existence of
its knowledge or its reason to know of the hazards is evident”); see also Coburn v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240–41 (D. Utah 2001) (noting that, because the duty to
warn depends on the manufacturer’s level of knowledge at the time of the drug’s release,

2013]

First Subscriber Compensation for Postmarketing Injuries

455

their requirement that plaintiffs pursuing failure-to-warn claims prove that the
manufacturer knew or should have known about the defect.194 Even if a court
were to find that the manufacturer knew of the relevant risk, the injured patient
must still prove that the drug caused the injury.195 As discussed previously,
proof of causation on the basis of adverse reaction reports alone will not
suffice.196 Thus, although proof of causation is scientifically possible, the
injured party will incur significant expense during litigation to prove that the
drug caused the injury.197 Consequently, the enormous costs of litigation
diminish the amount of compensation received by the victim.198 Further, relief
ultimately comes after a significant delay from the time of injury199 and, in
cases where causation cannot be proven, recovery may be denied altogether.200
When extrapolated to the larger population of drug users, additional
criticisms regarding the tort system’s ability to effect prompt and equal relief
become apparent.201 As a preliminary matter, scholars agree that the tort

knowledge attributable to the manufacturer can change in the case of a patient prescribed a
medication at various points in time); John G. Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans, 30 AM.
J. COMP. L. 297, 308 (1982) (“[Negligence] does not cover ‘development risks’, i.e., risks which
the manufacturer neither knew nor should have known at the time of marketing in the light of
existing scientific knowledge.”); Stephen Guest, Compensation for Subjects of Medical Research:
The Moral Rights of Patients and the Power of Research Ethics Committees, 23 J. MED. ETHICS
181, 182 (1997) (noting, in the context of a clinical trial, that “an injured subject cannot easily
claim that a risk was ‘reasonably foreseeable in the ordinary course of events,’ because the nature
of experiment is such that a. unforeseeable events are to be expected and b. there is an inherent
difficulty in establishing what the ‘ordinary course of events’ actually is”).
194. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(c)(i) (Supp. 2011); LaMontagne, 41 F.3d at 859
(noting the applicability of a similar rule in Connecticut); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d
324, 344 (Ill. 1990) (noting the applicability of similar rule in Illinois); Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 499 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting the applicability of a similar rule in
Idaho). Moreover, even in states that define prescription drugs as “unreasonably dangerous” or
“unavoidably unsafe” products—injuries from which would otherwise subject the drugs’
manufacturers to strict liability—the manufacturer nonetheless is absolved from liability when the
drug is accompanied by proper warnings. See, e.g., Wagner v. Roche Labs., 671 N.E.2d 252, 256
(Ohio 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1998).
195. See O’Reilly, supra note 85, at 560.
196. See id.
197. Id. (describing how a plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a
drug was the cause of harm, regardless of whether there are other plausible causes of the injury).
198. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 193, at 315 (suggesting that high litigation costs prevent
plaintiffs from bringing claims).
199. See James P. George, Access to Justice, Costs, and Legal Aid, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 293,
300 (2006) (describing delays in both state and federal civil litigation).
200. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(upholding the judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a drug manufacturing case in which the
plaintiff was unable to establish causation).
201. See James R. Copland, Administrative Compensation for Pharmaceutical- and
Vaccine-Related Injuries, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 275, 282–84 (2011) (describing flaws in the
tort system which compound as more litigants are involved).
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system results in unequal treatment of similarly situated parties.202 Two or
more similarly situated plaintiffs litigating identical products liability suits
against the same defendant, but in different jurisdictions, could have starkly
One plaintiff may recover; the other may not.
different results.203
Alternatively, both may recover, but receive dramatically different
compensation.204
Moreover, in pharmaceutical mass tort litigation, the ability to obtain
uniformity in relief is further hamstrung by procedural rules and legal
wrangling among the parties, precluding equality of treatment.205 Because
individual questions of causation and liability predominate in drug cases,

202.
Reformers are right to express serious concerns about horizontal inequity among
both plaintiffs and defendants within the tort system. Plaintiffs with similar injuries
are treated differently on the basis of both doctrinal and administrative
considerations that are unrelated to the nature of their injuries. By the same token,
defendants who commit similar wrongs are treated differently on the basis of
considerations that are unrelated to the character and injurious tendency of their
actions. Reformers are also accurate in noting the variability of outcomes due to
differences in factors like the availability of evidence, financial differences, the
quality of counsel, and jury composition.
Timothy D. Lytton et al., Tort Litigation as a Lottery: A Misconceived Metaphor, 52 B.C. L. REV.
267, 273 (2011) (footnotes omitted). Cf. Robert L. Rabin, September 11 Through the Prism of
Victim Compensation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 464, 472 n.35 (2005) (reviewing KENNETH R.
FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE
VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005)) (noting, in the context of the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund of 2001, that “[i]n every case, across the entire spectrum of no-fault programs, from
work-related to crime-related compensation and from injuries associated with military service to
the unfortunate victims of vaccine-related mishaps, there is not a single program that grants
recovery for wage loss reflecting the tort system’s fundamental disregard for considerations of
horizontal equity and need-based considerations”); see also Lytton et al., supra, at 273 (arguing
that reformers are justified in their concerns over the horizontal inequity experienced among both
plaintiffs and defendants).
203. See Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429, 536–37
(1986) (highlighting the inequitable outcomes in mass torts litigation due to when and where both
the injuries occur and the suits are filed).
204. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the
Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 176 (2004) (noting the “wide disparity” in jury verdicts
across jurisdictions caused by arbitrary concern with extraneous factors other than the actual
injury); see also Fleming, supra note 193, at 316 (criticizing the tort system for “discriminat[ing]
between different accident victims not according to their own deserts, but according to the
culpability of the defendant”). The disparity in recovery from state to state further extends to
punitive damages. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1997) (allowing uncapped
punitive damages in products liability cases), with VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (2007) (capping
recovery of punitive damages at $350,000), and Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb.
1975) (barring recovery of punitive damages).
205. See JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and
Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 756–57 (2004) (noting difficulties faced by plaintiffs
in mass tort litigation).
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class-action-type relief is often unavailable.206 In addition, because of
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ claims of the proprietary nature of internal
documents, protective orders entered in individual actions prohibit or delay
relevant information from becoming public, precluding those in other
jurisdictions from obtaining and using that same material in their suits.207
Despite concerns over treatment inequalities, some commentators continue
to support the tort system because it deters bad actors.208 For the same reason,
civil and criminal liability statutes are lauded as benefitting the marketplace by
encouraging compliance with the FDA’s manufacturing and marketing
standards while simultaneously imposing significant financial penalties when
manufacturers fail to comply.209 In response, however, the pharmaceutical
manufacturers’ conduct over time has disproved the deterrent effect of
litigation.210 Additionally, despite the massive fines imposed on prescription
drug manufacturers for federal law violations,211 none of that money benefits
206. See, e.g., Zehel-Miller v. Astrazenaca Pharms., LP, 223 F.R.D. 659, 664 (M.D. Fla.
2004) (denying class certification in pharmaceutical products liability litigation because
“individual questions concerning patient characteristics and medical history, physician
involvement, dosage, causation and comparative or contributory negligence, eviscerate any notion
that common issues predominate”).
207. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2008: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial
& Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Rep. Linda
T. Sánchez, Chairwoman, H. Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law) (suggesting that
confidentiality orders entered in products liability matters can have a deleterious effect on public
health and safety because they prohibit dissemination of the information to the public).
208. Parasidis, supra note 22, at 991–92 (suggesting that state tort claims encourage
companies to disclose information as quickly as it is available).
209. In recent years, the federal False Claims Act and Anti-Kickback Statute have been used
to prosecute prescription drug manufacturers for false advertising and for providing remuneration
to healthcare providers to encourage off-label prescription. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006
& Supp. IV 2011); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006); see also, e.g., Tim Mackey & Bryan A.
Liang, Off-Label Promotion Reform: A Legislative Proposal Addressing Vulnerable Patient Drug
Access and Limiting Inappropriate Pharmaceutical Marketing, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1,
24–26 (2011). Additionally, intentional falsification and concealment of documents in response
to an FDA request can result in criminal charges brought under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C.); see also, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559–62 (D. Md.
2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006)).
210. See supra notes 12–13, 26–30 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Duff Wilson, UCB
Pays $34 Million and Pleads Guilty in Epilepsy Drug Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES PRESCRIPTIONS
BLOG (June 9, 2011, 5:31 PM), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/ucb-pays-34
-million-pleads-guilty-in-epilepsy-drug-fraud-case/ (stating that an epilepsy drug fraud case was
one of many brought by the Justice Department for illegal marketing by a manufacturer).
211. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay
$3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.html (noting GSK’s agreement “to plead
guilty and to pay $3 billion to resolve its criminal and civil liability arising from [its] unlawful
promotion of certain prescription drugs, its failure to report certain safety data, and its civil
liability for alleged false price reporting practices,” making it “the largest health care fraud
settlement in U.S. history and the largest payment ever by a drug company”); see also Press
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those actually injured.212 Thus, litigation has proven ineffective at providing
comprehensive, equal relief to injured parties and is incapable of effecting
improved conduct of manufacturers in the marketplace.213
B. The Undisclosed Burden on Public and Private Insurance—Shifting Costs
to Responsible Parties
Absent a finding of fault on the pharmaceutical manufacturer, persons
injured by a medication in the postmarketing period are forced to rely on
insurance for relief.214 Although the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (PPACA) significantly increased the availability of insurance coverage to
the vast majority of Americans in 2010,215 some of those increases will not
occur for several years.216 Moreover, the public and private costs to fund
insurance programs are significant, particularly when the risks covered are
unknown.217 Using insurance to compensate postmarketing injury fails to
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Cases
in Fiscal Year 2010 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-civ
-1335.html [hereinafter 2010 DOJ Press Release] (highlighting a $2.3 billion settlement with
Pfizer Inc., which included “$669 million recovered under the federal False Claims Act, $1.3
billion in criminal fines and forfeitures, and $331 million in recoveries for state Medicaid
programs and the District of Columbia” and noting that “[t]he largest fiscal year 2010 False
Claims Act recoveries came from the pharmaceutical and medical device industries, which
accounted for $1.6 billion in settlements, including the $669 million from Pfizer Inc., $302
million from AstraZeneca, and $192.7 [million] from Novartis Pharmaceutical Corporation”).
212. In fact, “‘[q]ui tam’ provisions under the False Claims Act allow private individuals
acting as qui tam ‘relators’ [or whistleblowers] to bring a suit on the federal government’s behalf
involving past or present fraudulent acts.” Mackey & Liang, supra note 209, at 24 n.115 (citing
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006)). Whistleblowers are entitled to beteween ten and fifteen percent of a
suit’s proceeds. 2010 DOJ Press Release, supra note 211. (“In fiscal year 2010, [whistleblowers]
were awarded $385 million.”).
213. See supra notes 210, 212 and accompanying text.
214. O’Reilly, supra note 85, at 567 (stating that private insurance may cover the injuries,
but, for those who rely on government programs such as Medicare or Medicaid, the taxpayers are
ultimately responsible for paying medical claims).
215. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), amended
by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of 19, 20, 26, and 42 U.S.C.); see also Lawrence O.
Gostin et al., Restoring Health to Health Reform: Integrating Medicine and Public Health to
Advance the Population’s Well-Being, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1777, 1813 (2011) (discussing the
PPACA and noting that the Act will expand public access to healthcare by expanding insurance
coverage).
216. I.R.C. § 5000A(a), (d), (e) (Supp. IV 2011) (requiring every citizen to obtain healthcare
coverage or pay a fine starting in 2014).
217. In fact, Congress appears determined to further reduce the availability of publicly
funded healthcare options. See, e.g., Jason Kane, How Will Debt-Ceiling Deal Affect Medicare
for Patients, Doctors?, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN BLOG (Aug. 4, 2011 12:16 PM EDT),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/08/how-will-the-debt-deal-impact
-medicare.html (noting, in the wake of the Fall 2011 federal debt-ceiling negotiations, the
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provide complete relief because it accounts only for healthcare costs.218
Insurance does not provide coverage for tangential losses such as lost wages or
income.219 Ultimately, reliance on insurance as a comprehensive means of
providing economic relief following an adverse drug experience is misplaced.
Although estimates vary, various scholars suggest that the average cost to
treat adverse drug experiences will soon eclipse $100 billion annually.220
Moreover, because adverse drug experiences are routinely under-reported,221
and because increased access to healthcare programs is forthcoming, these
estimates are likely conservative.222 Ultimately, the question becomes whether
injuries from unlabeled adverse drug experiences sustained in the
postmarketing period are even the type of injury that insurance, or even tort
litigation, is intended to compensate.223 To the contrary, because the
pharmaceutical industry benefits from these injuries (allowing companies to
improve their products’ labeling, expand marketing, and avoid liability in the
future), are the pharmaceutical manufacturers not the parties who should pay
potential for cuts to Medicare and Medicaid as well as an increased eligibility age, co-pays,
deductibles, and limitations on elderly supplemental insurance plans).
218. For example, although the PPACA outlawed high-deductible insurance plans, even
under the new regime, certain deductibles persist. See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom
of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 2248 (2011). But see 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(2)(A) (Supp. IV
2011) (authorizing small group market plans to impose annual deductibles up to $2,000 for
individual plans and $4,000 for all other plans).
219. See Amalea Smirniotopoulos, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs, Preemption, and the
Potential for a No-Fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 793, 852 (2011) (discussing the
importance of wages as a remedy in mass tort litigation).
220. See, e.g., Kristin C. Oberg, Adverse Drug Reactions, 63 AM. J. PHARM. EDUC. 199, 199
(1999) (“The national yearly cost of drug related morbidity and mortality was recently estimated
at $76.6 billion. . . .”); T. Jeffrey White et al., Counting the Costs of Drug-Related Adverse
Events, 15 PHARMACOECONOMICS 445, 450 (1999) (describing a study in which costs from
adverse-drug reactions exceeded $130 billion nationally).
221. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
222. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012) (finding that
the PPACA requires expansion of Medicaid programs by 2014 to individuals under 65 who meet
certain economic criteria). This expansion potentially would have extended Medicaid coverage to
an additional 17 million individuals presently excluded from their state plans. See, e.g., Abby
Goodnough, Lines Are Drawn over Opting out of Medicaid Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, at
A1. It would also have provided those individuals with “access to the full apparatus of
Medicaid-funded services for their primary conditions, while their providers [would have gained]
access to more generous and secure funding,” which would have given them “coverage to treat
the physical and psychiatric co-morbidities that now often go unaddressed.” Harold Pollack,
Health Reform and Public Health: Will Good Policies but Bad Politics Combine to Produce Bad
Policy?, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2067 (2011). Nonetheless, following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sebelius, a handful of state governors have suggested that, for budgetary reasons, they
will consider opting out of the additional Medicaid coverage. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607–09
(holding that states are not required to expand Medicaid); see also Goodnough, supra, at A1.
223. Because these risks are unknown by definition, insurers are unable to properly estimate
and apply them to insurance premiums. They are also not the type that make recovery under tort
theories of law possible.
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for that benefit by compensating the injured parties?224 Although the PPACA
currently requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to fund a portion of the new
healthcare regime, that contribution does not cover the annual losses
attributable to adverse drug experiences.225 Further, the law does not require
that the fees collected from the manufacturers go to the victims of drug
injuries.226
Requiring the pharmaceutical industry to fully compensate those injured
from unlabeled postmarketing adverse events will not cure any expected
healthcare shortfall.227 The fact remains, however, that neither the government
nor the public should be responsible for compensating this group of
individuals.228 It is, instead, the group with the most vested interest in the
issue, the pharmaceutical manufacturers, that should provide the just
compensation to these injured parties.229
III. PROPOSING A NO-FAULT ALTERNATIVE
Neither the tort system nor the insurance system can fully and equally
compensate early subscribers to prescription drugs who experience an
unlabeled adverse event in the postmarketing period.230 Relief in tort is often a
quixotic pursuit, with very few able to prove liability for an injury,231 and
health insurance is expensive and often inadequate.232 The 10,000-patient

224. David B. Resnik, Compensation for Research-Related Injuries, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 263,
266 (2006) (“The principle of justice requires the benefits and burdens of research be distributed
fairly.”).
225. The PPACA imposes an annual fee on prescription drug manufacturers that will collect
a total of $28 billion between 2011 and 2019. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9008(a)(1), (b), 124 Stat. 119, 862–63 (2010), amended by Health Care
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1404(a)(1), (a)(2)(A),
(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1029, 1064 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4001 (Supp. IV 2011)). By
contrast, extrapolating from existing data the estimated costs associated with adverse drug
experiences over the same period could potentially exceed $1 trillion. See supra note 220 and
accompanying text.
226. Pollack, supra note 222, at 2072 (finding a flaw in the ability of a congressional
majority to cut or eliminate the appropriation on which the fund rests).
227. See Henry Huang & Farzad Soleimani, What Happened to No-Fault? The Role of Error
Reporting in Healthcare Reform, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2010) (noting that some
critics of the no-fault compensation system worry that costs will drastically increase).
228. See Fleming, supra note 193, at 308 (suggesting that, because the victims of adverse
events deserve compensation, they are essentially medical research volunteers); see also infra
notes 301–03 and accompanying text.
229. See Resnik, supra note 224, at 266 (arguing that medication researchers are bound to
minimize the harms that a participant receives).
230. See discussion supra Parts II.A–B.
231. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 214–18 and accompanying text.
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donut hole created by the FDAAA requires more reliable protections for
injuries sustained.233
Over the last century, numerous compensation schemes tailored to specific
sources of harm have been imposed both legislatively and otherwise234 to
provide more efficient and uniform relief to injured parties.235 In direct
response to the tort system’s vagaries, these plans attempt to rectify the
perceived “lottery aspects” attributable to tort recovery while simultaneously
reducing litigation costs.236 Most significantly, for purposes of this Article,
these alternative compensation schemes significantly relax the claimant’s
burden of proving causation and fault to qualify.237
Following in the footsteps of these existing plans, a similar compensation
scheme should be adopted for patients exposed to a prescription drug in the
drug’s initial marketing months.238 Although this Article does not advocate for

233. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
234. Workers’ compensation plans are one of the earliest and most obvious examples of
specialized compensation schemes, rising to prominence in the United States at the turn of the
twentieth century. See, e.g., Gregory P. Guyton, A Brief History of Workers’ Compensation, 19
IOWA ORTHOPAEDIC J. 106, 107–08 (1999) (providing an overview of workers’ compensation
plans). Since the 1920s, the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions have governed personal injury
and death claims arising from international air travel. See Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929,
49 Stat. 3000, 137 U.N.T.S. 11; see also Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
International Carriage by Air, opened for signature May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45
(entered into force Nov. 4, 2003). In the 1960s, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom
established funds to compensate children born with birth defects caused by their mothers’
ingestion of the drug thalidomide. Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast
Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV.
819, 908 (2011). In the U.S., alternative compensation structures have been created to address
injuries sustained from sources as varied as vaccine exposure, black lung, and nuclear disaster.
See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–945 (2006) (black lung); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2006)
(vaccines); 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006) (nuclear disaster). More recently, plans have been developed
to provide compensation to victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the 2010
Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. See, e.g., Linda S.
Mullenix & Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Fund
Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 121, 131–32 (2002); Alfred R.
Light, Designing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility in the Shadow of the Law: A Template from the
Superfund § 301(E) Report, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11121, 11121 (2010).
235. See, e.g., Light, supra note 234, at 11,124, 11,127 (describing a study group’s
suggestions for remedying the compensation plans).
236. See Fleming, supra note 193, at 306; see also Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style,
27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 188–89 (2008) (noting criticism of a fault-based tort system as
evincing “false morality” and resulting in “unpredictable damage awards, and high transaction
costs”).
237. See Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution, and Legal
Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 269 (2001) (arguing that the
standard of proof for plaintiffs in proving causation should be relaxed).
238. See infra Part III.A.
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an across-the-board no-fault compensation scheme for drug-related injuries,239
it does propose a specialized plan designed to address injuries caught in the
gap between premarketing clinical study and widespread exposure following
initial marketing.240
A. The Rationale for Adopting an Administrative Claims Fund
The FDAAA’s regulation of postmarketing surveillance of prescription
medications should be amended legislatively to include provisions that
establish a no-fault compensation scheme to care for patients injured by an
unlabeled adverse drug experience within the first eighteen months of
marketing.241 Pharmaceutical manufacturers would exclusively fund this
compensation scheme, with contribution being a prerequisite to all new drug
applications.242 Moving away from tort liability in this context is warranted
because a no-fault compensation system covering all injuries associated with
unlabeled events will be more equitable.243 Further, requiring contributions
from the private industry will reduce the government’s obligations and reduce
the attendant tax liability imposed on the public to support the insurance
system.244 To maintain the role of litigation, however, the FDAAA’s proposed
amendments should include an opt-out provision that would allow individuals
to exempt themselves from the compensation plan in order to pursue a tort
claim.245
Modifying the FDAAA to guarantee relief to this discrete patient group is in
line with the Act’s policy goals.246 Requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers to
compensate early subscribers to a new medication serves as a logical trade-off
to both Congress’s and the industry’s desires to expedite the approval of newly
developed medications.247 Early participants to a newly marketed drug provide

239. Cf. Smirniotopoulos, supra note 219, at 834–35 (proposing a no-fault compensation
scheme covering all drug and medical device injuries).
240. See infra Part III.A.
241. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(r)(2)(D) (Supp. IV. 2011); see also supra note 125.
242. Cf. Lytton et al., supra note 202, at 269 (explaining that no-fault accident compensation
would be funded by direct payments into a fund financed by risk creators).
243. See id. at 279 (arguing that a no-fault compensation scheme would compensate more
injured plaintiffs while also reducing administrative costs).
244. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (stating that Congress seems to want to
reduce publicly funded healthcare options).
245. See infra Part III.B.3.
246. See 153 CONG. REC. 25,162–63 (2007) (statement of Sen. Michael Enzi) (describing a
goal of offering a drug to the public while protecting those harmed by its adverse effects).
247. See, e.g., id. at 25,037 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (noting that the FDAAA
will provide “new research tools and better ways to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of
drugs,” while simultaneously expediting drug development and reducing development costs); see
also Evans, supra note 1, at 444–50, 457–58 (noting that preapproval trials cannot eliminate the
potential for risk in the postmarketing period).
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value to the pharmaceutical industry by allowing expedited marketing
approval, early signal detection, and expedited labeling changes.248
Pharmaceutical manufacturers receive significant financial benefits from a
new drug’s initial postmarketing evaluation.249 From a financial transaction
perspective, these “trial participants” should be compensated for the value
added to a drug’s worth as a result of the trial tests.250 But, beyond
compensation at the individual level, for Congress’s policy initiatives to
succeed and for the FDAAA to have value, society needs early subscribers to
Providing no-fault
expedite detection of latent adverse effects.251
compensation to a newly approved medication’s early subscribers will
incentivize participation on the part of new patients and encourage physicians
to prescribe new drugs.252
B. Considerations in Adopting a No-Fault System
Although a no-fault compensation system would improve horizontal equity
in the type of relief provided to injured parties, it is not a cure-all.253 Three
principal and intertwined considerations must be addressed before adopting
any no-fault plan: (1) eligibility; (2) administration and funding; and (3)
limitations on recovery.254

248. Cf. Light, supra note 234, at 11124 (relating, from the environmental context,
supporters’ arguments in favor of a compensation scheme alternative to tort litigation as “a useful
method of cost allocation and sharing, and a socially responsible method of internalizing the
emerging costs of industrial and technological development”).
249.
[In the FDAAA, Congress] gave [the FDA] a toolbox, a whole bunch of different
things that they can now do so that drugs will be approved faster, and then when
that clinical trial that we call the whole population of the United States kicks in,
there is a mechanism for following all of those and finding small samples of
problems, solutions to those small samples of problems, and the drug that is
working for people across this Nation doesn’t have to be pulled off the market. It
can still work for the people who aren’t affected by an adverse reaction. That is a
major change we have been able to make.
153 CONG. REC. 25,162–63 (2007) (statement of Sen. Michael Enzi) (emphasis added).
250. See Resnik, supra note 224, at 266 (arguing that a subject is entitled to compensation or
care for harms received during research).
251. Evans, supra note 1, at 455–56 (preferring postmarketing studies to premarketing
observational clinical trials for purposes of identifying adverse effects).
252. Cf. Huang & Soleimani, supra note 227, at 30–31 (explaining that a no-fault
compensation system provides incentives for doctors to report problems with drugs in the early
stages).
253. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
254. See infra Part III.B.1–3.
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1. Eligibility
Every tort claim requires that the injured party prove that the defendant
caused the injury.255 This causation requirement takes on added significance in
the prescription drug context.256 Because prescription drug users are typically
sick, often suffering from a myriad of physical maladies,257 causation must be
based on the outcome rather than the process.258 Accordingly, even in a
no-fault compensation system, the question of whether, and to what extent,
causation can be proved must be answered to gain access to any relief.259
Specifically, because proof of causation places an onerous burden on injured
parties,260 no-fault compensation systems often invoke a relaxed standard of
causation.261 For example, under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program (NVICP),262 which established a no-fault compensation fund to
provide relief for harms resulting from vaccinations, so long as the sustained
injury appears on the legislatively created Vaccine Injury Table, the injured
party need only show that the vaccination was received and that the injury
followed within the statutorily prescribed time period.263 Moreover, although
the NVICP requires proof of off-table claims by a preponderance of the
evidence,264 courts deciding the validity of off-table vaccine injury claims have

255. Solan & Darley, supra note 237, at 267 (“It is a legal maxim that people should be held
liable for only harms that they have actually caused.”).
256. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
257. Robert L. Rabin, Poking Holes in the Fabric of Tort: A Comment, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
293, 304 (2007); see also Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases
Resulting from Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REV. 613, 695 (2005) (noting the inherent difficulties
in establishing causation for latent diseases).
258. Schuck, supra note 236, at 199 (stating that causation is more often linked to
pre-existing conditions, which the public does not desire to compensate for, rather than to the
medication itself).
259. See id.
260. See supra notes 82–85, 197 and accompanying text (noting the potential for multiple
co-factors contributing to adverse drug experiences, which poses a challenge for plaintiffs trying
to prove actual causation).
261. See Janet Benshoof, Protecting Consumers, Prodding Companies, and Preventing
Conception: Toward a Model Act for NO Fault Liability for Contraceptives, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 403, 424–25 (1997) (discussing how the Virginia Birth Injury Act and
Longshore Act have relaxed the standard of causation required under their no-fault plans); see
also Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation: Mass Products Torts’ Incomplete Incorporation
of Social Welfare Principles, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 971 (2006) (noting several no-fault
compensation plans with relaxed causation requirements).
262. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2006).
263. Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Programs, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 59, 63 (1999); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-14 (establishing time periods within which specified injuries must have occurred to merit
a claim).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(A).
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incorporated the relaxed standard of causation for table claims when deciding
off-table claims as well.265
This emphasis on temporal proximity between exposure to the drug and
injury as evidence of causation has been adopted by at least one foreign
country in implementing its own no-fault drug-injury compensation scheme.266
In 1978, Sweden adopted a national pharmaceutical insurance system to
compensate drug-related injuries.267 To establish a causal connection between
drug and injury, the claimant only needs to “prove that there is a preponderate
probability that the injury was caused by the drug,” which can be demonstrated
by showing “a chronological connection” between ingestion and harm.268
Outside of the drug context, analogous domestic and foreign administrative
compensation schemes likewise relax causation requirements to expedite relief
to injured parties.269 For example, workers’ compensation plans replace proof
of actual causation with proof that the injury was sustained during
employment.270 In essence, workers’ compensation plans substitute proof of
causation with proof of temporality.271 The rationale behind this construct of
workers’ compensation plans turns on the questions of probability and who
was most likely responsible.272 New Zealand famously abolished tort law
265. Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act,
48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 394 (2011) (arguing that the Federal Circuit requires a lower level of
proof in vaccine cases to prove causation because the expert opinion of the physician and the
patient’s medical records can be sufficient).
266. See infra notes 267–68 and accompanying text.
267. Lotta Westerhäll, Disbursement of Indemnity for Injuries Related to Reproductive Drugs
and Devices: A Swedish Perspective, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 443, 443 (1997)
(characterizing the pre-1978 system as “weak”). Although tort remedies remain available to
Swedish citizens for drug injuries, most injured plaintiffs seek recovery through the
pharmaceutical insurance system. Id. at 445.
268. Id. at 448. (describing the pharmaceutical insurance system’s unique rule for
establishing causation).
269. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party Insurance: Advantages and
Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 616–19 (2000) (describing state no-fault automobile insurance
statutes that provide coverage for economic loss up to specified threshold levels without a
showing of fault).
270. Schuck, supra note 236, at 199 (generalizing workers’ compensation plans as requiring
proof only that the injury occurred on the job).
271. See Gifford, supra note 261, at 965 (providing examples of workers’ compensation
liability coverage for injuries that occurred while performing job-related functions or that were
caused by the employers’ conduct).
272.
The inquiry under the compensation statutes was . . . not who in any individual
work-accident case had caused the injury in question, but rather who—employers
or employees—was best described as responsible for the aggregate toll of
casualties in a given industry. . . . Causation would, in a sense, be determined by
legislative fiat for compensation cases as a whole on the theory that employers
were best described as the cause of the injury in the majority of the cases; the
individualized causation inquiry of tort law would be replaced by an inquiry into
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remedies for all personal injury claims in favor of a no-fault compensation
scheme in 1974273 and exemplifies this rationale in its continued reliance on
temporality and probability in assessing causation.274
More recent federal legislation and executive action in the United States
perpetuate the themes of temporality and probability in providing no-fault
compensation schemes for injuries sustained in specific contexts.275 For
example, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, a no-fault compensation system
covering all persons who were immediately affected by the attack and suffered
physical harm.276 Similarly, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, the administrative
fund developed to compensate injuries resulting from the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil rig explosion, “presumes” compensability based on “proximity to
the coast, or from direct dependence on natural resources such as beaches and
fish.”277
Despite a reduced burden of proof, to make a prima facie case under a
no-fault compensation scheme, the claimant must also meet a threshold
burden-of-production requirement to establish eligibility.278 Taking elements
from the various alternative compensation arrangements discussed above, a
workable proposal for claims assessment can be outlined.279
Under the NVICP, for example, the claimant must produce an affidavit and
supporting documentation demonstrating that he or she received the
vaccination at issue, sustained an injury listed in the Vaccine Injury Table or
other injury caused by the vaccine, that the injury was sustained in the relevant
time period outlined in the Act, and that the claimant has not previously been
compensated for his or her injuries.280 Similarly, under both the September
11th Victim’s Fund and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, personal injury and
the status of the parties accompanied by an unrebuttable presumption of employer
causation based on statistical tendencies.
JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 173 (2004).
273. See Schuck, supra note 236, at 188–89 (further explaining that this reform was not
demanded by the public but was the result of a small dedicated group working with judges).
274. See, e.g., Accident Compensation Act 2001, pt. 2, § 30(3)–(4), sched. 2 (N.Z.)
[hereinafter
New
Zealand
Accident
Compensation
Act],
available
at
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2001/0049/latest/DLM99494.html (providing that proof
of causation is not required for specific injuries resulting from workplace exposures to specified
“agents, dusts, compounds, [and] substances”).
275. See infra notes 276–77 and accompanying text.
276. Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(c)(2)(A), 115 Stat. 230, 239 (2001), amended by Pub. L. No.
111-347, § 202(d)–(e), 124 Stat. 3623, 3662 (2011).
277. See, e.g., Light, supra note 234, at 11126 (discussing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility and
the facility administrator’s thoughts on determining compensability for certain classes of
individuals).
278. See infra notes 280–81 and accompanying text.
279. See infra notes 290–91 and accompanying text.
280. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c) (2006).
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wrongful death claimants must produce, inter alia, medical records
demonstrating the injury or death, medical records reflecting diagnosis by a
physician, records showing expenditures for care, information showing
location of injury, and information regarding other means of compensation
available to the claimant.281 Other administrative compensation programs
largely follow suit, requiring proof of temporality or proximity, and at least
some suggestion by a physician of a causal association.282
Once the burdens of production and proof are met, many alternative
compensation schemes entitle the body administering the claims to challenge
causation.283 For example, the NVICP allows HHS to deny relief when
alternative causation is found.284 In such a case, however, the burden of proof
shifts to the agency.285 Moreover, evidence showing alternative causation does
not overcome the legal presumption created by the Vaccine Injury Table.286
In the context of the FDAAA, requiring the injured party to prove actual
causation unduly burdens the injured party and can preclude recovery.287 Also,
attempting to create a table of compensable injuries akin to the NVICP would
prove unworkable because the injuries are unknown.288 Instead, as workers’
compensation schemes and recent federal legislation have demonstrated,

281. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.21(b)(3) (2011) (providing criteria for submitting a claim under the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund); see also BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT
EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY REPORT OF FINDINGS AND EVALUATIONS,
app. at Ex. Q (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/66520
126611210351178.pdf.
282. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.101–.107 (2011) (requiring, for purposes of a claim under
the federal Black Lung Program, proof of injury as demonstrated by medical evidence); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-060-230, FEDERAL COMPENSATION PROGRAMS:
PERSPECTIVE ON FOUR PROGRAMS 37 (2005) [hereinafter FEDERAL COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/248586.pdf (noting the requirement
under the Black Lung Program that proof of a claim must be supported by a statement from a
pulmonary specialist); see also New Zealand Compensation Act, supra note 274, at pt. 3,
§ 55(1)(a) (requiring the claimant to supplement his or her claim with a “certificate by a
registered health professional”).
283. See, e.g., Benshoof, supra note 261, at 424–25 (noting that, under the NCVIA, the
Virginia Birth Injury Act, and the Longshore Act, once the claimant demonstrates an injury, the
defendant can rebut it by showing a lack of causal connection); Ridgway, supra note 263, at 63
(noting that HHS may dispute causation for injuries on the Vaccine Table by showing an
alternative cause).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1) (2006) (stating that compensation will not be granted if a
preponderance of the evidence indicates that the vaccine did not cause the injury).
285. Ridgway, supra note 263, at 63 (indicating that HHS must prove alternative causation).
286. Id.
287. See supra notes 82–85, 197 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting the potential for unknown side effects
with prescription drugs); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a) (2006) (limiting the presumption of
causation to a predefined list of injuries).
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temporality is the touchstone of an effective no-fault compensation plan.289
Accordingly, compensation under any proposed FDAAA modification must be
based on the temporality between drug ingestion and the incidence of adverse
symptoms.290 Specifically, this Article proposes that proof of causation for
postmarketing unlabeled events should be deemed satisfied by a showing that
the patient ingested the medication and was injured thereafter.291 In
compensating injuries from unlabeled adverse events, the FDAAA should
require claimants to submit documentation proving: (1) receipt of the drug; (2)
diagnosis of injury; and (3) suggestion of causation by or association to
ingestion of the medication.292 As with the NVICP, the administrative board
charged with adjudicating claims shall be allowed the opportunity to disprove
causation, but must do so by showing an alternative cause.293
2. Administration and Funding
Because of the federal government’s exclusive regulatory control over the
pharmaceutical industry, and the aforementioned benefits provided to that
industry by first subscribers to new drugs, this Article proposes that the
no-fault compensation scheme for first subscribers be administered by a
federal agency and funded entirely by the industry.294 Although the proposal
of a precise administrative structure for claims made by first subscribers to a
newly approved drug is beyond the scope of this Article, because of the large
patient population impacted by the no-fault compensation fund295 and its
geographic scope, the administration of the fund sensibly should reside within

289. See supra notes 270–72, 275–77 and accompanying text (discussing the temporality
standard applied in workers’ compensation plans, the September 11th Victims Fund, and the Gulf
Coast Claims Facility).
290. See infra note 291 and accompanying text. In fact, FDA regulations already provide a
framework for labeling changes that rely on temporal proximity between ingestion and injury.
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6) (2012) (stating that drug “labeling must be revised to include a
warning about a clinically significant hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal
association with a drug”). Some scholars have suggested a temporal relationship between
exposure to the drug and observed adverse effect may be the basis. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
291. Cf. Ridgway, supra note 263, at 63 (noting, in the context of the NVICP, that “[i]f the
first manifestation of a named injury occurs within the stated time period following vaccination
(for example, the first seizure as a manifestation of a seizure disorder), the injury is presumed to
have been caused by the vaccine” (emphasis added)).
292. See supra notes 280–82 and accompanying text (showing what the plaintiffs must
produce in similar no-fault plans).
293. See supra notes 283–86 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part III.A.
295. At minimum, that number is 10,000 patients per each prescription drug approved after
creation of the fund. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. For perspective, in 2011 the
FDA approved thirty-five new medicines. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA: 35
Innovative New Drugs Approved in Fiscal Year 2011 (Nov. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/%20Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm278383.htm.
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the federal government, whose institutional knowledge in administering similar
funds would benefit those developing this new plan.296 As other scholars have
proposed, one logical place to situate the fund’s management would be HHS,
From an
one division of which already administers the NVICP.297
administrative standpoint, asking HHS to govern a fund that would bear many
of the same characteristics as the NVICP is intuitive.298 Moreover, as others
have noted, separating fund administration from the FDA’s governance over
drug approval avoids the problem of agency capture.299 Conversely, by
keeping review within HHS, safety information could be disseminated to the
FDA for its use in drug safety assessment.300
Similarly, asking members of the pharmaceutical industry to finance this
proposed compensation structure offers the most logical option with respect to
funding the plan.301 For obvious reasons (i.e., because the manufacturers’
products caused the injuries at issue), similar no-fault compensation programs
are funded by industry,302 including vaccine injury programs in Norway,
Sweden, Taiwan, and the United States.303 Further, the infrastructure designed
to collect revenue is already in place and requires only an increase in the
amounts to be collected to fund this new administrative fund.304 Both the
FDAAA and the PPACA impose annual fees on prescription drug
manufacturers in order to fund, respectively, a rejuvenated FDA drug safety

296. See supra notes 263–65 and accompanying text for a discussion of a similar federal
fund.
297. See, e.g., Smirniotopoulos, supra note 219, at 848–49.
298. Under the NVICP, following a claimant’s application to HHS, special masters appointed
by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims determine the claimant’s eligibility. See, e.g., Ridgway,
supra note 263, at 63. These decisions are then subject to approval by the Court of Federal
Claims and are appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id. This same
structure could be expanded and applied with only slight modification to handle claims made by
the first 10,000 drug users to a newly marketed drug for unlabeled adverse effects.
299. See, e.g., Smirniotopoulos, supra note 219, at 849 (arguing for separation of the drug
compensation fund from the FDA so as to insulate it from undue influence, an issue experienced
in the past); cf. Mullenix, supra note 234, at 823 (criticizing the administrator of the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility as “a heroic ‘special master’ with limitless unreviewable discretion, who also is in
the employ of the malefactor”).
300. See supra Part I.B.
301. See Fleming, supra note 193, at 306 (articulating the common refrain in support of
alternative compensation plans as providing for more efficient allocation of resources, which, in
this case, would be to ask pharmaceutical manufacturers to fund a plan from which they would
benefit); see also supra note 251 and accompanying text.
302. The Black Lung Program is funded by an excise tax on coal mined and sold in the
The
United States.
FEDERAL COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, supra note 282, at 15.
Price-Anderson Act, which was designed to compensate victims of nuclear accident, is funded by
nuclear licensees. Mullenix & Stewart, supra note 234, at 138–40.
303. See, e.g., Geoffrey Evans, Vaccine Injury Compensation Programs Worldwide, 17
VACCINE S25, S26 tbl.1 (1999) (discussing vaccine injury compensation programs worldwide).
304. See infra notes 305–07 and accompanying text.
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regime and healthcare reform.305 Imposing an additional fee on prescription
drug makers, which could be incorporated into the FDAAA’s existing fee
structure, would establish private liability insurance for injuries sustained in
the relevant period.306 This insurance structure would be no different from
those employed by other no-fault compensation schemes.307
3. Limitations on Recovery
In order to avoid an endless stream of claims directed to the fund for newly
discovered adverse drug effects, limitations on recovery must be imposed.308
This Article suggests the following restrictions on access to the fund: (1) time
limitations for asserting claims; (2) limitations on specified damages amounts
for all injuries and aggregate caps on recovery; and (3) availability of relief
pursuant to tort causes of action only after the exhaustion of remedies under
the administrative system.309
Imposing a time bar on access to the fund is no different from statutes of
limitations barring state-law tort claims, and it parallels existing no-fault
compensation funds.310 As this Article has already proposed, claims to be
covered by the fund would be limited to those sustained during the first
eighteen months after marketing approval, parallel to the time period
established by the FDAAA for initial review and assessment of newly
approved drugs.311 For purposes of filing a claim, this Article proposes
extending the time to assert a claim to one year after the close of the FDA’s
initial eighteen-month review, equaling thirty months after receipt of FDA
marketing approval.
This extension avoids fraud and allows for time to identify latent or
unrecognized diseases or symptoms.312 Further, this extension takes advantage
of the FDA’s existing obligation under the FDAAA to “prepar[e], by 18
305. See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
§ 103(a)–(b), 121 Stat. 823, 826–28 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379h(a)(2)–(3), (b) (Supp. IV 2010))
(establishing a prescription drug user fee to be paid, in part, by prescription drug manufacturers);
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9008(a)(1), (b), 124 Stat. 119,
859–60 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, § 1404(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1029, 1064 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 4001 (Supp. IV 2011)) (establishing an annual fee on prescription drug manufacturers).
306. See supra Part III.A.
307. See supra notes 234–38 and accompanying text.
308. Similar no-fault compensation funds have also imposed certain limitations. For
example, a fund established to compensate victims of 9/11 prevents claims from being filed more
than two years after the fund’s creation. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(a)(3), 115 Stat. 230, 238 (2001).
309. See infra notes 310–27 and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, § 405(a)(3) (barring claims
filed more than two years after the fund’s establishment).
311. See supra Part I.C.
312. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. e (1979).
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months after approval of a drug or after use of the drug by 10,000 individuals,
whichever is later, a summary analysis of the adverse drug reaction reports
received for the drug, including identification of any new risks not previously
identified.”313 A filing extension beyond the eighteen-month assessment
window provides early subscribers an opportunity to review the FDA’s
postmarketing report on a drug and determine whether symptoms observed or
injuries sustained could potentially be attributable to the drug.314 A one-year
extension for filing claims will ensure that new subscribers are not
unnecessarily barred from recovery for legitimate harms.315
Beyond time limitations on recovery, this Article further proposes the
imposition of maximums on recovery by a patient and on the manufacturer’s
total monetary liability for any one drug.316 Regarding individual recovery,
patients’ recovery must be limited to calculable, economic loss,317 and then
only to predetermined amounts as set by the fund’s administrative review
board.318 For purposes of determining baseline claims amounts, fund
administrators could rely on claims tables from workers’ compensation
statutes, analogous statutory funds like the NVICP,319 and commonly used
actuarial models.320 In order to estimate fee amounts to be imposed on
manufacturers to finance this fund, it is equally necessary to cap total liability
per drug.321 Once damages tables are developed for individual claims, the
amount of liability for each drug is arguably finite. Those individual claims
amounts can be used to determine the total potential monetary exposure

313. 21 U.S.C. § 355(r)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 2011).
314. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
315. Conversely, the administrative review board could potentially use reliance on the FDA’s
eighteen-month new drug assessment to deny a claim that does not appear on the report. The
board could argue that sufficient postmarketing testing has not revealed a link to the claimed
injury.
316. In addition, this proposal would account for relief obtained through other means (e.g.,
life insurance) and use those amounts received to offset recovery under the plan. See, e.g.,
Mullenix, supra note 234, at 859 (noting the use of the collateral source rule in administration of
both the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility).
317. Damages for pain and suffering, and any other noneconomic losses, should not be
covered under this program. Cf. id. at 854 (noting the exclusion of pain and suffering awards
from claims submitted under the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001). In fact,
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 provides a comprehensive definition of
economic loss, which could be used as a model for any compensation structure adopted for the
FDAAA. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42 § 402(5),
115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001).
318. See infra notes 319–20 and accompanying text.
319. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 (2006).
320. Mullenix, supra note 234, at 854.
321. See infra note 322 and accompanying text.
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attributable to each newly approved drug and establish a cap on the amounts
recoverable for injuries claimed attributable to that medicine.322
Lastly, this Article proposes that any adopted plan provide an opt-out
opportunity to claimants who wish to pursue relief through tort litigation.323
Retaining the possibility of tort litigation incentivizes manufacturers to work to
prevent harm through continued study and observation of their product in the
postmarketing period.324 Historically, no-fault plans that have not included an
opt-out provision have been criticized as intending to serve only industry
Conversely, to discourage claimants from forgoing
manufacturers.325
administrative relief in favor of litigation, the proposal would require that
claimants first exhaust all available administrative relief before pursuing any
possible legal claim.326 Ultimately, to ensure finality to all claims administered
pursuant to the fund, claimants to the fund would be required to waive all legal
claims arising from the injuries sustained.327
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed amending the FDAAA to establish a no-fault
compensation scheme designed to provide administrative relief to those injured
by newly approved prescription drugs during the first eighteen months of the
drug’s marketing.
The FDAAA, in its laudable efforts to improve
postmarketing detection of adverse drug experiences attributable to newly
approved drugs, has extended observational study of new medications to their
first subscribers.
322. At least one other no-fault compensation fund has instituted a similar cap on liability.
See, e.g., Mullenix & Stewart, supra note 234, at 140–41 & nn. 86 & 92 (noting the
Price-Anderson Act’s de facto cap on liability in light of its funding requirements, and the
Supreme Court’s upholding of the cap in the face of a challenge under the Due Process Clause).
But see id. at 140 n.86 (noting criticism of the Price-Anderson Act “for setting a limit on liability,
in light of the possibility that [funds collected from industry] may not be enough to compensate
claimants adequately in the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence”).
323. Opt-out provisions like the one proposed herein are commonplace in the context of
no-fault compensation schemes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A) (2006) (providing
opt-out criteria for NVICP).
324. See Benshoof, supra note 261, at 414 (1997). Examples of bad actors within the
pharmaceutical industry persist. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. However, a
compensation plan should be able to separate those greedy and dishonest manufacturers from
those acting in good faith. Benshoof, supra note 261, at 412.
325. Benshoof, supra note 261, at 416–17 (finding that such no-fault plans eliminated many
economic safety incentives for manufacturers).
326. Cf. id. at 414 (noting a claimant’s ability to waive a damages award under NVICP to
pursue a civil claim against a manufacturer only after having “fully adjudicate[d] [his or her]
claims through the compensation program” (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11(a)(2)(A), 21(a)
(2006))).
327. Cf. Mullenix & Stewart, supra note 234, at 130 (noting that “[t]he centerpiece concept”
of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 “is that claimants give up their rights
and ability to resolve their claims through the tort litigation system”).
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An administrative fund serving this patient group is warranted here precisely
because traditional tort remedies are practically unavailable to this patient
population. Moreover, an administrative fund, financed by the pharmaceutical
industry, is intuitive because the information gleaned from this type of
postmarketing study inures to the benefit of the industry itself. The FDA’s
eighteen-month postmarketing surveillance improves manufacturers’ abilities
to provide comprehensive warnings associated with their products to the
public, increasing their products’ marketability, while simultaneously reducing
manufacturers’ exposure to tort claims for failure to identify and warn of these
same risks. With the enactment of the FDAAA, the continued viability of
newly approved prescription drugs rests on the backs of these first subscribers.
This Article asks only that prescription drug manufacturers do the right thing
by compensating those who make the continued marketing of their products
possible.
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